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Abstract 
A global trend of decentralisation has been present in the last decades. Since the 
1980s, most countries have transferred power and resources from the centre to 
subnational levels of government. This trend has also been present in the 
developing world where it has been encouraged by international organisations as a 
way of promoting citizen participation and democracy. The purpose of this thesis 
is to investigate if there is empirical evidence to support these arguments.  
The present thesis is devoted to the study of the consequences of political and 
fiscal decentralisation in the non-Western world. Based on a sample of 69 
countries, I investigate the effect of political and fiscal decentralisation on 
democratic quality and citizen participation in politics. Citizen participation is 
defined as voter turnout in national elections and non-electoral participation. From 
multiple regression analyses I find empirical support for a significant correlation 
between decentralisation and citizen participation in control for relevant factors. 
In particular I find a strong correlation between political decentralisation and 
voter turnout in national elections. The analysis shows no support for a connection 
between decentralisation and democratic quality, which puts in doubt the 
argument of decentralisation as a means to achieve democratisation. 
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1 Introduction 
Decentralisation has in the last three decades emerged as an efficient and 
normatively appealing way to improve the quality of governance. The surge in 
support for decentralisation is attributed to its claimed abilities to empower 
marginalised groups in society and correct imperfections in both economic and 
political policy areas. The capacity strengthening and democratising potentials 
have made it attractive for policy makers throughout the world, not least in the 
developing countries. International donors and organisations such as the World 
Bank, IMF, and the OECD have encouraged the trend toward decentralised 
government. Since the 1980s, a majority of the developing countries has 
undertaken decentralising reforms in order to strengthen democracy and 
encourage citizen participation (Vo 2010: 658; Diamond & Tsalik 1999: 121). 
The ideas of a connection between decentralisation, citizen participation and 
democracy have been around since Alexis de Tocqueville’s study on the 
American democracy in the 1830s (de Tocqueville 2000 [1835-40]). The purpose 
of the present thesis is to investigate the empirical evidence of these ideas. 
Decentralisation essentially means that power and resources are transferred 
from the centre to smaller local governments. It is a way of distributing political 
power and bringing it closer to the citizens. Throughout history, smallness has 
commonly been thought of as beneficial for democracy. In ancient Greece the 
city-state was viewed as the only possible setting for democracy. Aristotle 
believed that in a democracy, all citizens must be able to gather at a common 
place at the same time, and still be able to hear the speaker (Dahl & Tufte 1973: 4-
5). Schumpeter (2008 [1950]: 258-9), for his part, maintained that city politics is 
the only type of politics that ordinary citizens can truly understand and take part 
in. In more recent time, Robert Dahl is a noticeable proponent of the city as the 
ideal size for democracy. Dahl advocated a democratic unit not so big as it 
“reduces participation to voting, nor so small that its activities are trivial” (1967: 
967). Decentralisation has also strong theoretical groundings in the economic 
literature of fiscal federalism where it is seen as a way of improving the efficiency 
of the public sector (see Oates 1977). As a developmental strategy, 
decentralisation is widely encouraged by donor organisations as a method of 
improving the quality of governance and citizens’ political representation (see 
Rondinelli 1980; Hadenius 2003a). For a variety of reasons, decentralisation has 
become one of the major global trends in politics in the last decades. 
In Latin America and Asia, decentralisation was a major component in the 
democratisation reforms following the third wave of democratisation (Oxhorn 
2004). Central and Eastern Europe embarked on decentralising reforms as the 
economies transited from central planning to market economies (Rodríguez-Pose 
& Krøijer 2009: 387-88). In Africa decentralisation in the 1990s was also a 
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reaction against authoritarianism and economic inefficiencies, although the 
reforms are generally less thoroughly implemented (Khadiagala & Mittullah 
2004: 190-1).  
Examples of successful results from decentralisation, perhaps most 
prominently in Porto Alegre in Brazil, underline the promises of decentralised 
government as a method to stimulate citizen participation and local 
democratisation. But experience throughout the world has also shown that 
decentralisation in many cases come short of the high expectations attached to the 
reforms. It has become clear that, regardless of its potentials, decentralisation is 
not a panacea for all societal ills. When decentralisation is introduced in countries 
with poorly developed political institutions and weak traditions of organised civil 
society, it is also associated with risks. In some cases it may actually damage the 
democratic quality and economic performance (Smoke et al. 2006a: 3). 
In this thesis, I take a comprehensive approach to how decentralisation affects 
democratic quality and citizen participation in 69 non-Western states. Based on 
multiple regression analyses I conclude that decentralisation correlates with 
higher degrees of electoral and non-electoral political participation. Most 
interestingly, I find a strong causal correlation between political decentralisation 
and voter turnout in national elections. However, decentralisation does not seem 
to have any effect on democratic quality. I even find some indications of a 
negative correlation, which puts in doubt one of the most commonly used 
arguments of decentralisation as a developmental strategy. 
1.1 Purpose and Research Question 
Most of the previous research on decentralisation and political participation is 
based on case studies, or comparisons between a small number of cases (e.g. 
Smoke et al. 2006b; Oxhorn et al. 2004; Hadenius 2003a). As a contrast, this 
thesis covers the overall development in 69 countries throughout the world. 
Economic research shows that decentralisation have different impact on 
developed and developing countries. Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that 
decentralisation in developing countries actually tend to have adverse affects on 
economic growth (Davoodi & Zou 1998). There is also an on-going discussion 
about whether a well-established democracy is necessary condition for 
decentralisation to function as intended (Martinez-Vazquez & McNab 2006: 16). 
The purpose of this study is, thus, to investigate if the positive effects of 
decentralisation on citizen participation and democracy have materialised in 
developing or newly democratised non-Western countries. 
Although decentralisation is a global phenomenon, comparative studies are 
usually limited to countries in a single region. Recently, though, this has begun to 
change and scholars have started taking an interest in comparing the experiences 
of decentralisation in a cross-regional perspective (Smoke et al. 2006a: 4). With 
its wide focus on four different world regions, this thesis contributes to the effort 
of broadening the knowledge of the effects of decentralisation policies. Whereas 
  3 
there are several large-N studies on the economic consequences of 
decentralisation, its effects on political participation and democracy is usually 
studied in a narrower context. To my knowledge, this thesis is the first attempt to 
study the impact of decentralisation on political participation on a global level. 
Despite the wide range of theoretical literature on the subject, there is little 
empirical evidence to support the underlying arguments for decentralisation. On 
the contrary, economic studies show that decentralisation tends to cause 
subnational overspending, and there is no established positive connection between 
decentralisation and economic growth (Rodden 2002; Davoodi & Zou 1998). It is 
often argued that the various shortcomings are due to superficial or reluctant 
implementation of the reforms (e.g. Bland 2011; Ryan 2004; Finot 2002). Some 
scholars seem to suggest higher doses of the same medicine to achieve the desired 
effect. Others point to the detrimental side effects of the treatment (e.g. Harbers 
2010; Eaton 2006; Sabatini 2003). National policy-makers also appear to be more 
in doubt about the benefits of transferring power to subnational governments. In 
some Latin American and African states a recent counter-trend to decentralisation 
has been present (Eaton & Dickovick 2006; Riedl & Dickovick 2013).  
Given the global trend of decentralisation in the last decades and the current 
uncertainty about the perks of strong local governments, a study about 
decentralisation as a measure to improve democratic governance and as a stimulus 
to popular engagement in politics merits attention. The research question reads: 
 
Has decentralisation lead to increased citizen participation in politics and 
improved the democratic quality in non-Western countries? 
 
The research question is studied using ordinary least square (OLS) multiple 
regression analyses based on cross-section data. The sample consists of 69 non-
Western countries from four different world regions. In an effort to improve the 
validity of the study, I work with two different measurements of decentralisation 
and political participation. 
The decentralising reforms have been implemented to varying degrees in 
different countries in the world. If decentralisation causes improved democratic 
quality and increased political participation, the effects should be most visible 
where the reforms have been most thoroughly implemented. And consequently: 
where decentralisation is superficial or absent, the effects should be less evident. 
Improved knowledge about the connection between decentralisation, political 
participation and democracy in a non-Western context would be useful for 
national policy-makers and international donor organisations alike. In the 
following section I present the data and key concepts for the present study. 
1.2 Key Concepts and Data 
As stated above, the purpose of this study is to investigate the effects of 
decentralisation on political participation and democratic quality. The main 
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concepts for this study are thus decentralisation, political participation, and 
democratic quality. What follows is a brief overview of each of the concepts. A 
more exhaustive description of the operationalization of the concepts can be found 
in chapter four. 
Prior to the explanation of the main concepts, the choice of the 69 countries in 
the sample that I have decided to give the generic term “non-Western,” begs 
attention. It should be noted that the countries are not selected merely on the merit 
of not being part of the Western world. Rather, all the countries in the sample are 
either experiencing, or have recently experienced a developmental stage in terms 
of democracy or economic development. A vast majority of the countries are part 
of the developing world, and most of them have recently experienced democratic 
transitions. A more thorough explanation of the population and the sample can be 
found in section 4.2 and 5.1, respectively. 
The most important concept of this thesis is of course decentralisation. This is 
the independent variable of the study from which I study the effects on civil 
society and democratic quality. In practice, decentralisation means that powers are 
transferred from the centre to subnational levels of government. The devolved 
competences can include areas such as the ability to elect politicians, powers to 
levy taxes, or responsibility over administrative tasks, such as public care and 
education (Falleti 2005: 329). There is an on-going debate about how to best 
capture the many aspects of decentralisation into measureable and comparable 
variables (see Schneider 2003). A common solution is to divide the phenomenon 
into different conceptual categories (e.g. Harbers 2010; Falleti 2005; Schneider 
2003). In accordance with previous research, in this study I make a distinction 
between fiscal and political decentralisation. Even though I am mainly interested 
in the political – as opposed to the economic – benefits of decentralisation, it 
makes sense to include both variables in the study. Whereas the variable for 
political decentralisation reveals whether citizens have the power to elect their 
local politicians, the economic variable shows how much power the local 
governments can actually exercise in relation to the central government. 
Political decentralisation can be defined as the “establishment or 
reestablishment of elected autonomous subnational governments capable of 
making binding decisions in at least some policy areas” (Willis et al. 1999: 8). 
Countries in which the local legislative and executive are locally elected are 
consequently considered politically decentralised. In some countries, local 
elections are held but the local executives are appointed by higher levels of 
government. These countries are not considered as fully politically decentralised 
since they do not comply with the criterion of local autonomy. Data on this 
variable are collected from the World Bank’s Database of Political Institutions 
(Beck et al. 2001).1 
Fiscal decentralisation is measured as subnational revenue and expenses in 
relation to the general government. For this purpose, I use data from the 
International Monetary Fond’s Governance Finance Statistics Yearbook (GFSY). 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
1 The data used in the study refer to the year 2012. 
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IMF provides the most complete data on different expenditure and revenue shares 
on different tiers of government, and GFSY is consequently the standard data 
source in comparative studies. But the data are not without faults, which I come 
back to in section 3.4.1, where I also discuss some problems of reliability this 
causes. 
Political participation is the first dependent variable for this study. The 
variable is operationalized in two separate components: voter turnout in elections, 
and non-electoral participation in politics. In the present thesis, voter turnout 
should be understood as an indicator of citizens’ involvement in politics. Voter 
turnout is measured as the percentage of voting age population voting in national 
elections. Voter turnout has the clear advantage of being easily measured and 
compared between countries and over time. But decentralisation is also said to 
wider the scope for direct political participation. The second operationalization 
therefore takes into account the non-electoral participation, that is, the degree to 
which citizens try to influence politics through organised political action. Political 
participation in this respect bears many similarities to social capital; but the two 
concepts are not identical. According to Robert Putnam (1995: 665), what 
distinguishes the two concepts is that “[p]olitical participation refers to our 
relations with political institutions. Social capital refers to our relations with one 
another.” Hence, only participation in activities that aim to affect public policies 
or society are considered. Cultural or sport activities could be of interest in studies 
on social capital or inter-personal trust, but are not relevant for the present study.  
Political participation can either take the form of direct participation in 
demonstrations and similar activities, or of indirect participation by membership 
in various types of political or civil organisations. This measurement is based on 
worldwide survey data from World Value Surveys. 
The second dependent variable is democratic quality, which is measured on a 
scale to be able to compare degree of democracy. I use a combined index of the 
two most commonly used measurements of democracy, provided by Polity IV and 
Freedom House. According to Hadenius and Teorell (2004) a combination of the 
two indices gives the most reliable measurement of democracy. 
A final note on key concepts should be added before I go on to discuss the 
delimitations of the present study. In a highly influential and oft-cited article, 
Rondinelli (1980) discusses decentralisation in developing countries in the terms 
of deconcentration, delegation and devolution. The terms refer to the extent and 
form of decentralisation and are widely used in comparative studies on the 
subject. However, these terms are primarily referred to in regards to 
administrative decentralisation (World Bank 2014). To avoid conceptual 
misunderstandings, I have decided not to use them in this study. 
1.3 Delimitations 
Decentralisation is a broad topic that has attracted attention from different 
research disciplines in the last decades. This thesis is delimited to the political 
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aspects of the phenomenon, with emphasis on the democratic merits of 
decentralisation. In this section I discuss some delimitations in regards to the 
scope of the study, and the data and method applied. 
A limitation of large-N studies, such as this one, is that they make it difficult 
to capture nuances and differences at lower levels of abstraction. Large-N studies 
are less apt for studying thick concepts, and are consequently often criticised for 
being reductionistic in nature (Coppedge 1999). Decentralisation can take many 
forms and contemporary research is not exclusively focused on degrees of 
decentralisation. For instance, the speed of decentralisation and which 
administrative task to decentralise (Burki et al. 1999), the local governments 
reliance on own tax revenues (Rodden 2002), and the sequence of decentralisation 
(Falleti 2005) are some examples of current research topics. But these questions 
about variations of implementation of decentralisation lie beyond the scope of this 
thesis. 
The main methodological delimitation is that I have decided to base the 
analysis on cross-section data. I acknowledge that time-series data would be 
preferable since it enables the researcher to study changes over time. It also makes 
it easier to study causal correlations since it is possible to see if the cause precedes 
the effect by lagging the dependent variable and thereby control for reversed 
causality (Teorell 2009: 210). Unfortunately, this is also more complex and time 
consuming. A further obstacle is the unavailability of survey data on political 
participation over a longer time period, which is why I have decided to delimit the 
study to cross-section data. 
Following these introductive notes, the thesis is divided into five chapters. In 
chapter two the theoretical underpinnings of decentralisation is presented 
alongside three hypotheses. In chapter three I present a short survey of how the 
theories have been translated into reality in four world regions. Chapter four is 
devoted to methodological considerations and the operationalization of the main 
variables. The results from the statistical analysis are presented in chapter five 
together with some reflexions on the import of the findings. The thesis is then 
concluded in chapter six, in which I summarise the main conclusions drawn from 
the study. 
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2 Theories of Decentralisation 
Decentralisation has, not only administrative value, but also a civic dimension, since it increases 
the opportunities for citizens to take interest in public affairs; it makes them get accustomed to 
using freedom. And from the accumulation of these local, active, persnickety freedoms, is born the 
most efficient counterweight against the claims of the central government, even if it were supported 
by an impersonal, collective will. 
 
Alexis de Tocqueville – cited in Vo (2010) 
 
The ideas that have made decentralisation into such a widespread and far-reaching 
trend in politics in the last decades were based on both efficiency arguments in 
economic theory, and arguments within the political science, often with a 
normative emphasis. In this chapter I explain the overall rationale for both 
arguments. The chapter is divided into four parts. In the three parts that follow I 
present the economic theory of fiscal federalism, the theoretical link between 
decentralisation and citizen participation, and the impact of decentralisation on 
democracy. Based on the theoretical overview, I present my three hypotheses in 
the last section of this chapter. 
 
2.1 Fiscal Federalism 
Like the swings of a pendulum, the opinions on the right level of centralisation 
have changed back and forward over time. In the post-war period, the 
conventional economic wisdom was that centralised power improved planning 
and stimulated economic progress. Centralisation was for this reason promoted as 
a developmental strategy in developing countries. However, following the 
economic crisis in the 1970s and early 1980s, the pendulum swung back in favour 
of the minimalist state. Since then, a majority of countries have devolved political 
or economic powers to local governments (Oxhorn 2004: 11-12). The tendency 
toward decentralised government picked up pace in the 1990s, and seemed to 
reach its peak around the turn of the millennium. Since then the reforms have lost 
some of its previous popularity (Bland 2011: 66). A recent counter-trend to 
decentralisation in Latin America and Africa suggests that preferences for 
decentralisation might again be in decline (Eaton & Dickovick 2006; Riedl & 
Dickovick 2013). 
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Much of the interest for theories of decentralisation in the last decades derives 
from fiscal federalism in economics, a subfield to public finance. Theories of 
fiscal federalism deal with the assignment of provision for public goods2. In the 
1950s, the prevailing knowledge was that there was no satisfactory way to reveal 
citizens’ preferences for public goods, because it would be “in the selfish interest 
of each individual to give false signals, to pretend to have less interest in a given 
collective consumption activity than he really has” (Samuelson 1954: 388). Due to 
this free rider problem of public goods, an optimal level of provision could in 
theory not be determined at a local level, which created a strong case for 
centralisation. In his seminal article, Charles Tiebout (1956) challenged this view 
and introduced a model in which the mobility of the citizens provides a sorting 
mechanism (the Tiebout sorting) that allows people to vote with their feet. That is, 
if localities compete among themselves and citizens can move freely between the 
localities, their true preferences for local public goods will be revealed by the 
migration pattern (Vo 2010: 660-1). 
Theories of fiscal federalism are commonly divided into a first and a second 
generation. The first generation of fiscal federalism (FGT) was influenced by the 
Keynesian ideas of public finance in the 1950s and 1960s with an emphasis on 
macro-economic stability and equitable income distribution. A key aspect was 
also the correction of market failures, often due to interjurisdictional spillover 
benefits that caused under-production of public goods, which called for public 
interventions. The second generation of fiscal federalism (SGT) takes inspiration 
from the theories of public choice. One of the key new insights is that public 
officials have their own self-interests, which often diverge from the common 
public interest. SGT also emphasises the asymmetry of information that makes 
local actors better informed about such things as local preferences and conditions. 
Interjurisdictional competition is another crucial element of the SGT as it puts 
restraints on government, depicted as a Leviathan seeking to maximise tax 
revenues, and promotes accountability (Oates 2005: 350-62). As the argument 
goes, interjurisdictional competition can stimulate innovative policies that 
improve cost-efficiency. The chances for good, innovative policies to evolve 
increase when a multitude of localities are pursuing experimental practices 
simultaneously. In the ideal case, a dynamic competition between localities 
emerges, which enables for comparison and copying of good practises (Boadway 
& Tremblay 2012: 1071; Vo 2010: 666). 
However, a key condition for decentralisation to function as a means to 
enhance economic efficiency is citizen participation. Participation is the 
mechanism through which local preferences are revealed to the policy-makers and 
is consequently a “prerequisite for reducing inefficiencies” (Finot 2002: 137). 
Civic engagement in politics is also crucial for citizens to be able to hold 
politicians accountable, which in itself is a condition for ensuring that public 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
2 A public good is commonly defined as a good that is nondiminishable (the consumption by one person does not 
affect the availability of the good to other persons) and nonexcludable (nonpayers cannot be excluded from 
consuming the good) (Frank 2010: 568). 
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service provisions are tailored after the local demands (Boadway & Tremblay 
2012: 1071). 
The combination of the economic efficiency arguments and normative 
political gains of local empowerment created a strong case for decentralising 
reforms and contributed in making it a widespread practice in numerous countries 
in the world (Finot 2002: 135). The optimism that motivated decentralisation 
reforms throughout the world was based on the assumption that “participation 
develops and fosters the very qualities necessary for it, and that the more 
individuals participate, the better able they become to do so” (Altman & Lalander 
2003: 64). As we shall see, these ideas are far from new. 
2.2 Decentralisation and Political Participation 
The main argument for decentralisation is to make government more easily 
accessible by bringing it closer to the citizens. By bridging the gap between 
politicians and citizens, the political process becomes more open and transparent. 
Decentralisation has the potential to open up new ways of exercising political 
influence and can create a stimulus for popular political engagement (Hadenius 
2003b: 1). The discussion of the value of citizen participation in local politics 
dates far back in political science. Participation also has a prominent position 
within the study of democratic theory. What follows is a survey of the theoretical 
literature on the subject, and some of the empirical findings. 
Alexis de Tocqueville’s study of the American democracy in the 1830s is the 
first and one of the most influential arguments for the benefit of decentralised 
government and the key importance of voluntary organisations. Throughout his 
journey across the United States, de Tocqueville was struck by the high degree of 
local government autonomy and the absence of a meddling central power. He 
argued that this was made possible by the many voluntary organisations that held 
the society together and could carry out functions normally performed by the state 
bureaucracy. According to de Tocqueville, the voluntary organisations served an 
important democratic function in the American society as they were characterised 
by an egalitarian nature and openness for participation by people from all walks of 
life. Set in contrast to the centralising tendencies of the post-revolution French 
administration, de Tocqueville asserted that voluntary organisations could 
function as a bulwark against centralisation (Skocpol 1997: 457). 
The interest for the civil society is also evident in the social sciences today. 
One of the most well known studies in recent time on the role of civil society in 
politics is The Civic Culture by Almond and Verba (1963) in which the authors 
explore the connection between different political cultures and citizens’ relation to 
political institutions. The study was pioneering as the first attempt to 
systematically study political culture as an explanatory variable in political 
processes in a comparative context. Almond and Verba concluded that only the 
civic culture, characterised by citizen participation, is appropriate for democratic 
regimes (Street 1994: 98). Renewed interest was drawn to the subject in the 1990s 
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with Putnam’s (1993; 2000) seminal studies about social capital.  In his study of 
Italy, Putnam concludes that “[e]ffective and responsive institutions depend, in the 
language of civic humanism, on republican virtues and practises” (Putnam et al. 
1993: 182). These insights have revitalised the interest for the civil society in 
recent years as it underlines the importance of a dynamic and participatory civil 
society for the efficiency of public institutions. 
Modern scholars have picked up de Tocqueville’s idea of voluntary 
organisations as schools of democracy that help citizens develop the democratic 
skills necessary for meaningful participatory actions (van der Meer & van Ingen 
2009: 282). Citizen participation is a way of “socialization into democratic norms, 
through a process of learning by doing” (Hadenius & Uggla 1996: 1622). For this 
reason, the promotion of civil society organisations has been a prioritised target in 
developmental strategies from the 1980s onward (Pateman 2012: 7), and 
decentralisation has been one way of reaching this target. In order to promote an 
active civil society it is important to create institutional settings in which the civil 
society can interact with government and exercise influence. This is the idea 
behind moving government closer to the citizens. Most civil organisations have a 
local geographical scope, and local governments are to a higher extent dependent 
on local support for implementing its policies. The bargaining position of the civil 
society is, thus, better in a local context (Hadenius & Uggla 1996: 1630). 
Facilitating the access to political institutions is also a central theme in the 
participatory model of democracy.3 Proponents of this theoretical orientation in 
democratic theory argue that citizens are naturally inclined to participate, but are 
discourage to do so by inaccessible institutional structures (Hudson 2010: 15-16). 
Pateman (1975: 18) argues that participation should be “a part of everyday life” 
which could be achieved by introducing elements of direct democracy parallel to 
the representational form of democracy. 
Some successful experiences show that decentralisation could be a way of 
reaching these targets. An often-used example in the debate is the participatory 
budgeting (PB) developed in Porto Alegre. Participatory budgeting is a practise of 
local governance that allows ordinary citizens to take decisions regarding the 
allocation of parts of the municipal budget. The practise originates from the 
Brazilian municipality Porto Alegre in the late 1980s following the 1988 
constitution that, among other things, substantially increased the local autonomy 
and the subnational share of revenue. PB has since then spread to over 250 cities 
worldwide (Goldfrank 2007: 147, 155). In many ways, Porto Alegre epitomises 
the potentials of decentralisation. In line with theories of fiscal federalism, it 
exemplifies the innovative practises that can evolve from local governance and 
shows how the provision of public goods can be customised to the local demands. 
PB also provides a strong argument for the participatory model of democracy, as 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
3 The participatory model of democracy was developed in the 1960s as a reaction against realistic democratic 
theories about citizen participation. Participatory democracy is strongly associated with its main theoretical 
contributor Carole Pateman who has, among other things, argued for a democratisation of the workplace 
(Pateman 2012: 7, 10). 
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it provides a context where representational and direct elements of democracy are 
combined (Fung 2011: 859). This example shows the dynamic and innovative 
practises that can evolve from decentralisation. As seen, creative public policies 
can be one way of encouraging participation. But the smallness and the intimacy 
of local governments could, in itself, also foster participatory behaviour. This is a 
common theme in democratic theory. 
According to Dahl (1967), there are trade-offs to consider in relation to the 
size of democratic units. Too big units, and the politics become remote and 
inaccessible for the citizens; too small, and the questions become trivial. Small 
units, such as the city-states in ancient Greece, also have difficulties dealing with 
problems that go beyond the city’s boundaries. Dahl advocated a medium sized 
city, within a larger decentralised structure, as the appropriate size for democracy. 
In such contexts, political socialisation can occur, and civic virtues may evolve 
through citizen participation in political processes. In his now famous study Who 
Governs?, Dahl (2005) provides an exhaustive analysis of the city politics at work 
in his home town New Haven. In addition to presenting benign settings for citizen 
engagement in politics, it has also been argued that citizens are better qualified to 
participate in a local context. Schumpeter, famous for his minimal vision of the 
role of citizens in democracy, argued that politics at the local level could create 
scope for popular participation in politics, as it constituted “the little field which 
the individual citizen’s mind encompasses with a full sense of its reality” (cited in 
Oxhorn 2004: 17). 
Decentralisation can also create more inclusive representation. The cost of 
running for office is lower at the local level, which can benefit nonconventional 
political actors and empower previously under-represented segments of society. 
Regionally concentrated minority groups are for this reason often better 
represented at local levels of government (Diamond & Tsalik 1999: 129). 
Furthermore, previous research in Western states also show that decentralisation 
has a tendency to increase voter turnout. Studies on Germany and Spain suggest 
that municipalities with more decentralised powers also tend have higher turnout 
numbers in local elections (Michelsen et al. 2014; Blais et al. 2011). 
Notwithstanding the many positive outcomes that may evolve from 
decentralisation, the reforms are also associated with risks. Decentralisation opens 
up new avenues of influence on local politics. This may benefit the ordinary 
citizens, but corrupt actors may also exploit the new opportunities to access local 
policy makers. Corruption is often higher at the local level, and the auditing of 
government is usually less advanced than at national level (Prud’homme 1995: 
211). A related concern is that the local elite captures the decentralising process. 
This is sometimes the case in new democracies, where decentralisation opens up 
pockets of authoritarianism (Harbers 2010: 607). 
To summarise, there are strong theoretical arguments to support the idea of 
decentralisation as a means of enhancing citizen participation. Moving 
government closer to the citizens can make it more reachable and easier to 
influence. The example of participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre also shows 
how local governments can experiment with new, innovative policies that make 
the institutional structures more accessible for the ordinary citizens. The city is 
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often seen as constituting an appropriate size for democracy, and some argue that 
citizens are better qualified to participate at the local level. Finally, 
decentralisation can bring about improved representation and integrate local 
minority groups into politics. But making government more accessible could also 
prove detrimental. Corruption and local elite capture are recurrent phenomena that 
affect many developing countries. 
 
2.3 Decentralisation and the Quality of Democracy 
Decentralisation is often promoted for its democratic merits. For instance, United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID) describes decentralisation 
as “a means to achieve democratization” (DDPH 2009: viii). Fox (1994) 
maintains that local governments provide good learning opportunities for 
democratic practises. Further, a World Bank report states that decentralisation 
promotes political stability by integrating new actors into the political processes 
and thus serves as an “alternative to civil war or other forms of violent 
opposition” (Burki et al. 1999). There are many arguments in the theoretical 
literature for the case of decentralisation as a means to improve government 
performance. Among these, several refer to how decentralisation enhances 
representation and improves distribution of power and resources. For instance, it 
has long been argued that stability and national unity are promoted by involving 
more people in the political system. With the involvement of broader societal 
groups, more people have an interest in maintaining the political system 
(Rondinelli 1980: 135-6). For the sake of clarity and comprehensibility, the 
overview of the theoretical literature is structured under two overall themes – 
arguments concerning inter-municipal competition, and arguments related to the 
size of political units. At the end of the section I present the results from two 
previous studies on decentralisation and democracy. 
The first strand of arguments is based on the assertion that smallness creates 
fruitful conditions for democracy. The research on how the size of countries 
affects the prospects for democracy has a long history within the political science. 
Historically, states with a population below one million have been significantly 
more liable to democratic governance than larger states. The democratic quality 
also tends to be higher in small countries (Diamond & Tsalik 1999: 117). Dahl 
and Tufte (1973) originally claimed that small states offer more favourable 
conditions for democracy because of higher levels of homogeneity. Anckar (1999) 
instead argues that it is primarily the island status that separates microstates from 
other states. But when tested in a larger statistical study Teorell (2010: 51) shows 
that size affects democracy, while island status is not a contributing factor. 
Consequently, the current research position is that smallness has a direct effect on 
the quality of democracy. An interesting follow-up question is thus whether large 
states can reap these benefits by subdividing government into smaller 
decentralised political units. 
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Diamond and Tsalik argue just this. They hypothesise that large states can 
mimic the conditions in small states by devolving power to local governments, 
and thereby make decision-making more similar to how it function in small 
democracies. They base their argument on three main assumptions. First, 
decentralisation restrains the power of central government. De Tocqueville 
claimed that the American localities served as checks on the national government 
since the local governments were responsible for the implementation of the 
decisions taken at the national level. Decentralisation could therefor prevent 
backslides into authoritarianism (Diamond & Tsalik 1999: 120, 130). 
Second, decentralisation develops contingent consent that reduces political 
radicalism. Contingent consent signifies that parties that lose elections accept the 
outcome based on the confidence that the winning party will not use its powers to 
bend the rules of the game to its own favour. Decentralisation can help bring 
about these conditions by allowing for opposition parties to win seats at lower 
levels of government. This can also obstruct the development hegemonic parties 
and reduce radicalism by giving more actors a stake in the political system 
(Diamond & Tsalik 1999: 130-32). 
Third, the possibilities to hold politicians accountable are better at the local 
level. There is empirical evidence from different world regions to suggest that the 
citizens trust the local government more. Local government is both seen as easier 
to influence and better suited to solve regional political issues. As a result, citizen 
often perceive local governments as more responsive than their counterpart at the 
national level (Diamond & Tsalik 1999: 125-27). The same argument about 
improved accountability is also prevalent in economic theory (e.g. Seabright 
1996). 
The second strand of arguments concerns the inter-municipal competition. 
This strand of theoretic reasoning is characteristic for the economic literature on 
decentralisation. As discussed above, according to the public choice inspired 
second generation of fiscal federalism, decentralisation can disperse the 
monopolistic powers of the Leviathan and hence discourage excessive taxation 
and public expenditure. The logic behind the argument is that such practises 
would cause outmigration and the loss of tax revenues (Brennan & Buchanan 
2000 [1980]: 209). The same reasoning can easily be transferred to other issue 
areas than levels of taxation. According to these arguments, decentralisation 
makes empowered local jurisdictions compete amongst themselves for mobile tax 
bases, which provides them with incentives to, for instance, battle local 
corruption. This is what is known as yardstick competition, and is made possible 
by enabling citizens to compare practises in different jurisdictions (Bjedov et al. 
2010: 15).4 However, competition between jurisdictions does not always foster 
good practices. A well-known difficulty with decentralised government is to 
retain hard budget constraints. The base of the problem is that decentralisation 
can provide local officials with the incentives to act irresponsibly and exceed their 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
4 Recall the Tiebout sorting model described above (section 2.1) for further explanation of the underpinnings of 
this argument. 
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means because of an expectation of being bailed out by the central government in 
difficult times. The importance of reliance on own tax revenues is for this reason 
stressed in economic research on decentralisation (Oates 2005: 360). Another 
problem in relation to over-dependence on fiscal transfers from higher 
government entities is that central actors can exploit the situation by establishing 
systems of patronage and thus retain its political influence on the localities. This 
phenomenon is primarily an issue in developing countries (Hadenius & Uggla 
1996: 1631). 
To my knowledge, there are so far only two previous statistical studies on how 
decentralisation affects democracy and quality of governance (i.e. de Melo & 
Barenstein 2001; Martinez-Vazquez & McNab 2006). Both studies are concerned 
with a different sample than the present study, and only one of them deals directly 
with democratisation. The findings from both studies suggest that decentralisation 
improves government practises. De Melo and Barenstein (2001) have investigated 
the relationship between decentralisation and corruption and indicators of 
accountability, government efficiency and rule of law. They find that governance 
is improved by high degrees of decentralised fiscal resources. Martinez-Vazquez 
and McNab (2006) focus more directly on decentralisation and democracy. From 
a cross-country study of around 50 developing and non-developing countries, they 
conclude that decentralisation and democracy are interlinked in a bidirectional 
causal relationship. 
The main points from this section are that the claim that decentralisation 
enhances democratic quality has strong theoretical groundings. Dividing society 
in smaller units can improve representation and integrates wider groups into the 
political processes. In addition, yardstick competition between jurisdictions can 
promote good practises. As I have shown, previous studies also suggest that 
decentralisation tend to be connected with improved levels of democracy. In the 
following section the reviewed literature is used to formulate three hypotheses 
that will later be tested in the analysis. 
2.4 Hypotheses 
In the theoretical review above, I have shown that the economic efficiency 
arguments of decentralisation and the normative political arguments in many 
cases go hand in hand. Moving government closer to the people is often promoted 
for normative democratic reasons, but is also in line with the economic 
assumption of asymmetry of information. Political participation is central in 
democratic theory, but is also a condition in theories of fiscal federalism as it is a 
way of revealing citizens’ preferences. In addition it makes it easier to hold 
politicians accountable for their policies. In other words, the “criterion for 
economic efficiency coincides with the political principle of subsidiarity” (Finot 
2002: 135). Based on the theoretical overview above, I shall now draw up my 
three hypotheses. The hypotheses are guided by the discussed theories and are 
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formulated in manner that makes it possible to test them accurately with the 
available data. 
As shown in the previous sections, the theories in the social sciences that 
motivated the recent wave of decentralisation were based on the assumption that 
decentralisation stimulates citizen participation in politics. The theoretical 
discussion of the value of citizen engagement in local politics dates far back and 
has strong normative appeals. It has the potential of strengthening the connection 
between the electorate and its elected politicians and encourages marginalised 
groups in society to make their voices heard. 
This brings me to the first hypothesis. Citizen participation is a key variable 
for decentralisation to have its intended effects. Decentralisation provides links 
between civil society and politicians and induces citizens to take part in politics. 
The theoretical review shows that decentralisation can improve representation and 
give more people a stake in politics by paving the way for new political 
movements (Rondinelli 1980; Diamond & Tsalik 1999; Hadenius 2003b: 1). If 
representation improves, it is also likely to assume that people become more liable 
to vote in elections. The first hypothesis therefor reads: 
 
H1: There is a significant positive correlation between decentralisation and 
voter turnout in national elections. 
 
Empiric evidence from Europe support the claim that decentralisation can 
have positive affects on turnout in local elections (Michelsen et al. 2014; Blais et 
al. 2011). It remains to be seen if national turnout figures are also affected by 
decentralisation in the studied sample of countries. The risk for local elite capture 
could, however, also be present in many countries, which would most likely limit 
the effects of decentralisation on participation. 
The theoretical literature also shows that decentralisation can open up new 
ways of directly influencing government. Like in the city-states in ancient Greece, 
local government could wider the scope for direct participatory actions by citizens 
in politics. Smallness and frequent interactions can stimulate cooperative 
behaviour (Axelrod 1984: 21). Moreover, civil organisation most often have 
primarily local interests, where government also happens to be most dependent on 
public support for the implementation of its policies (Hadenius & Uggla 1996: 
1630). This is the reason why moving government closer to the citizens is 
believed to stimulate participation. The assumption is stated in the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H2: There is a significant positive correlation between decentralisation and 
non-electoral political participation. 
 
Non-electoral participation refers to organised political actions with the aim to 
affect political institutions or society. The definition and operationalization of this 
variable, and all others mentioned here, are further developed in chapter four. 
Another central selling point of decentralisation is that it is said to improve 
democracy. Local government can create possibilities for democratic schooling 
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(Fox 1994). Subdividing government in large states into smaller units may create 
similar conditions as are present in small states, where democracy has better 
chances for development (Diamond & Tsalik 1999). Furthermore, decentralisation 
can also give rise to dynamic competition between local jurisdictions that leads to 
improved practises (Bjedov et al. 2010). The combination of arguments regarding 
size and interjurisdictional competition motivates the third hypothesis: 
 
H3: There is a significant positive correlation between decentralisation and 
democratic quality. 
 
As shown in previous research, the likelihood of good practises to evolve from 
interjurisdictional competition largely depends on the central governments’ ability 
to maintain hard budget constraints and for the local governments to prevent the 
central government from establishing systems of patronage, which is particularly 
difficult in developing countries (Oates 2005: 363; Hadenius & Uggla 1996: 
1631). 
In the next chapter I shortly describe the causes, motives and consequences of 
decentralisation in the studied regions. 
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3 Decentralisation in Four World 
Regions 
The character and content of decentralisation vary between different countries. 
The driving forces that motivate policy-makers to reshape the power relation 
between different tiers of government are diverse, and so is also the 
implementation of the reforms. Nevertheless, as I show in this chapter, some 
general trends can be identified. Some factors are tied to particular conditions in 
the different regions. Others are shared across regional boarders. 
In this chapter I will make an exposition of the overall development in four 
world regions. I will show that different dynamics and historical conditions have 
affected the degree of centralisation. In Latin America the colonial heritage has 
been an important factor. Urbanisation and a long period of economic growth and 
structural changes provided demands for decentralisation in Asia. The transition 
to market economies is a factor that separates Central and Eastern Europe from 
the other world regions. Africa stands out on account of its particularly difficult 
contextual conditions. Notwithstanding the differences, some major common 
trends can also be identified. The wave of decentralisation has been closely linked 
to democratisation in every region. International organisations also tended to 
influence the process. Furthermore, decentralisation has often been connected 
with market liberalisations (Oxhorn 2004: 3). The first region reviewed is Latin 
America, where the changes have been particularly dramatic. 
3.1 Latin America: A Quiet Revolution  
Decentralisation is one of the most extensive changes in political administration 
that Latin America has experienced. The move toward decentralised government 
is in many ways a turning point in the history of the region. It marks a break with 
the centralised way of government that was inherited from the colonial era and 
that characterised the region since independence. It has rightly been described as a 
“watershed” (Bland 2011: 66) or a “quiet revolution” (Campbell 2003). The trend 
coincided with economic liberalisations following the so—called Washington 
Consensus, and re-democratisation in many of the countries (Oxhorn 2004: 11-
12). 
In Latin America, the re-democratisation following the third wave of 
democratisation (see Huntington 1991) and the debt crisis in the 1980s were the 
main impetuses for decentralisation. Overly centralised government was seen as a 
strongly contributing factor for both authoritarianism and economic shortcomings 
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(Finot 2002). The debt crisis revealed inefficiencies of the old centralist system in 
the delivery of public services. National policy-makers, inspired by the already 
discussed theories of fiscal federalism, saw decentralisation as a measure to 
enhance economic efficiency and the quality of governance (Willis et al. 1999: 
16). The trend was also encouraged by various international actors, including 
donor organisations, lending institutions, and organisations for economic 
cooperation (Vo 2010: 658). In addition to the economic reasons and international 
pressure, decentralisation had normative appeals given its democratising 
potentials (Smoke et al. 2006a: 3). 
Historically, the local governments in Latin America have primarily been 
assigned responsibility for tasks such as refuse collection and maintenance of 
infrastructure and public spaces. With decentralisation, this has radically changed. 
The localities are nowadays responsible for a variety of public services, such as 
education, social assistance, health, and the provision of water and sanitation 
(Bland 2011: 75). 
However, the extent to which the decentralising reforms have been 
implemented varies across the region. The pattern shows that small states are less 
liable to sweeping political decentralisation. Consequently, Ecuador, Paraguay, 
and the Dominican Republic have experienced low degrees of decentralisation. 
Governors are locally elected in these countries, but the central governments have 
the authority to overrule decisions taken at the local level. Colombia, Argentina, 
Mexico and Venezuela are the countries in which the political decentralising 
process has reached furthest. These countries have decentralised powers to elected 
provincial and local governments. The subnational governments enjoy formal 
autonomy from the central government (Willis et al. 1999: 10-11). 
Fiscally, Venezuela and Mexico have maintained the most centralised system 
among the major countries in the region; in these countries the central state 
controls nearly all tax collection responsibilities. Colombia and Argentina have 
come a bit further, but the process has reached furthest in Brazil (Willis et al. 
1999: 10-12). 
As I have discussed in a previous section, the participatory budgeting (PB) in 
Porto Alegre is one of the most well known examples of how decentralisation can 
create new democratic structures that facilitate citizen participation. Far-reaching 
decentralising reforms following the 1988 Brazilian constitution created scope for 
innovative municipal practises that eventually resulted in the PB in Porto Alegre 
(World Bank 2008: 1). However, decentralisation in Brazil and Argentina has not 
been entirely successful. Both countries have experienced problems maintaining 
hard budget constraint, which has caused severe cases of fiscal instability (Oates 
2005: 361). As a consequence of economic crises, policy makers in Argentina and 
Brazil have in recent time re-centralised some powers and responsibilities (Eaton 
& Dickovick 2006). In addition to problems of maintaining hard budget 
constraint, several countries have experienced local elite captures and 
decentralised corruption. Moreover, some scholars argue that decentralisation has 
caused party fractionalisation and obstructed the development of nationalised 
party systems (Harbers 2010: 607). 
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3.2 Asia: Adjustment to Structural Changes and 
Democratisation 
Asia was a latecomer to decentralisation but has nevertheless made important 
changes in central and non-central government relations in the last two decades. 
Starting in the 1990s, a wave of decentralisation has swept through the continent. 
Virtually every country has been affected, especially in East Asia where high 
degrees of centralisation traditionally has been the predominant state of conditions 
(White & Smoke 2005: 1; Oxhorn 2004: 13). The Philippines was the first East 
Asian country to embark on decentralising reforms in 1991. Vietnam followed 
suit a few years later. With the 1997 constitution, Thailand also took steps toward 
a more decentralised political system (Uchimura 2012: 5-6). India, China, 
Indonesia and Cambodia have also decentralised government functions in recent 
years. In general, the implementation of the reforms seems to have run 
comparatively smoothly, and without many of the difficulties experienced in other 
regions (White & Smoke 2005: Ch. 1; Kalirajan & Otsuka 2012).  
The incentives to decentralise vary across the region, but some shared factors 
explain why decentralisation gained momentum in the 1990s. First, with a long 
period of economic growth and urbanisation, the demand for public services 
gradually increased. Decentralised administrative structures have generally been 
seen as a method to improve the delivery of public services in order to meet the 
new demands. Second, as always, decentralisation is a process driven by political 
considerations. The transition from authoritarian rule has been a motivating factor 
for some countries, such as the Philippines, Indonesia and Cambodia. Also 
Thailand introduced decentralising reforms in the mid 1990s in tandem with 
democratisation following massive demonstrations against the military’s 
interference in politics (White & Smoke 2005: 4; Turner 2006: 262-63). 
In the Philippines, the civil society played an important part in pushing for a 
more decentralised distribution of the political powers. The transfer of resources 
and responsibilities to local governments was a break away from colonial 
centralism, a legacy from Spain. The high degree of centralisation became 
impractical as the population rapidly expanded in the 1960s. In the transition to 
democracy after 1986, the Philippines made major advancements toward a more 
decentralised system of government (Angeles & Magno 2004: 212-17). 
The Asian Financial crisis in 1997 also motivated decentralisation in the 
region. The movement for democracy in Thailand gained force during the crisis 
(Rüland 2012: 7). In Indonesia, the crisis gave rise to a wave of political protest 
that eventually forced president Suharto to resign. The transition to democracy 
was accompanied by far-reaching decentralising reforms. Indonesia, as well as the 
Philippines, has also tried to use decentralisation as a method of mitigating armed 
ethnical conflicts by establishing autonomous regions for regional minority 
groups (Turner 2006: 257-59).  
To conclude, in Asia decentralisation came late but has so far progressed 
comparatively well and without many of the difficulties found in developing 
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countries in other world regions. The driving forces for decentralisation have 
primarily been structural changes and democratisation. A continent where 
decentralisation has been considerably more difficult to implement is Africa, 
which I review in the following section. 
3.3 Africa: Poverty, Big-Men and Neopatrimonialism 
Among the surveyed regions, Africa is most likely the continent that poses the 
most challenging contextual conditions for successful decentralisation. Even 
though Africa has a long history of experiments with decentralisation, the process 
is in most countries not far advanced. The local governments’ autonomy vis-à-vis 
the states is generally weak. At the local level, elite capture is a recurring 
phenomenon and in many countries powerful central actors oppose and counteract 
the reforms. Nevertheless, almost every country in the region has undertaken 
decentralising reforms at some point in the last decades. Major advances took 
place in the 1990s (Wunsch 2001; Riedl & Dickovick 2013; Prud’homme 2003: 
17-18). 
A number of contextual difficulties have made decentralisation difficult to 
implement in Africa. Instability and lack of resources are two impediments to 
progress. Most countries on the continent suffer a scarcity of resources, both in 
terms of money and human resources. Many African countries have also 
experienced recurrent social and economic turbulence. Ineffective government 
and public institutions, in combination with poverty make the countries vulnerable 
to economic fluctuations. What is more, the ethnic and religious diversity that 
characterise many of the countries often create tensions, especially when 
combined with poverty and economic turbulence. A further difficulty is the 
widespread clientelism, a consequence of unequal distribution of wealth. Public 
resources are hence liable to be misused in neopatrimonal relationships in the 
localities. A final aggravating contextual condition is the instability of the African 
states (Olowu & Wunsch 2004: 13-14). 
Under most of the colonial era, the African countries experienced high degrees 
of political and economic centralisation. However, during the late colonial years 
the colonial rulers introduced a system of local governments throughout the 
continent. This period is sometimes referred to as a golden age of local 
government. The local government were locally elected and were responsible for 
local tax systems and some minor administrative tasks and infrastructure projects. 
However, with independence these systems of local governments were largely 
abandoned. The newly independent states prioritised rapid development, and saw 
central planning as a means to reach this objective (Olowu & Wunsch 2004: 32-
33). 
In an effort to reduce expenditure during the economic crisis in the 1970s, a 
wave of re-decentralisation emerged. International economic institutions were a 
driving force in this trend as they encouraged the African states to adopt 
decentralisation as a component in structural-adjustment programmes. This wave 
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of decentralisation was in general not very successful. The central governments 
were reluctant to give up political influence, and the reforms were in many cases 
underfinanced. Generally, administrative responsibilities were devolved, but not 
the necessary resources to perform them. Nevertheless, in the 1990s the 
decentralising reforms picked up speed and this time the policy-makers were more 
committed to the reforms. At the same time, a parallel trend of democratisation 
and liberalisation took place (Olowu & Wunsch 2004: 34-38). 
According to a World Bank paper from 2002, the speed of decentralisation in 
Africa is moderate, particularly in francophone Africa. The most ambitious 
decentralising reforms have been implemented in South Africa, Uganda and 
Kenya (Ndegwa 2002). In general, African policy-makers have been reluctant to 
transfer power and resources to local governments. Centrally appointed local 
officials is still a common practise on the continent (Riedl & Dickovick 2013). 
In South Africa decentralisation was a major component in the post-apartheid 
reforms. South Africa is unique in the sense that a decentralised system of local 
governments existed under apartheid, but only in the white populated localities 
(Prud’homme 2003: 18). The reformation of this system became one of the first 
priorities for the government that took over after the fall of apartheid in 1994 
(Edoun 2012: 102). In 2000 a new system of local governments was established 
and South Africa is today one of the most decentralised countries in the region 
(Cameron 2003: 114; Friedman & Kihato 2004). 
 
3.4 Central and Eastern Europe: A Breakaway From 
Central Planning 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) stands out in the sense that decentralisation 
was closely interlinked with the fall of communism after 1989. During the 
communist years, the CEE economies were characterised by systems of central 
planning. In the 1990s decentralisation coincided with both democratisation and a 
transition to liberal market economies. The transfer of economic and political 
powers to the subnational level was in many countries seen as a breakaway from 
communism and the discredited economic system of central planning. For some 
countries, decentralisation was also a way improving the chances of becoming 
members of the EU. As in the three world regions discussed above, international 
actors such as donor organisation and organisations for economic cooperation 
have played a supportive and encouraging role in this transition (Rodríguez-Pose 
& Krøijer 2009: 388, 392). 
On a political level, the local governments were during the communist era 
strongly dependent on the central government and the local politicians were in 
most cases members of the communist party. The local autonomy was in other 
words weak, and most political power and resources were highly centralised. The 
re-establishment of locally elected governments thus became an important 
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component in the democratisation process in the region in the 1990s. The legacy 
of central planning is, however, still strong and the central governments are often 
reluctant to decentralise responsibilities (Bratic 2008: 140-44). 
The promises of membership in the EU were a strong stimulus for 
decentralisation in the Baltic states, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. 
Decentralisation was in these states largely an adjustment to the Western 
European regional structures (Rodríguez-Pose & Krøijer 2009: 393). The adoption 
of Western regional structures was also a necessity in order to get regional grants 
from the EU after becoming member states (Bratic 2008: 148). 
The decentralising reforms vary across the region in terms of degree and pace 
of implementation. In some countries the transition has been without much 
difficulties. In others, the absence of clearly stipulated assignment responsibilities 
has complicated the process. The degree of fiscal decentralisation is highest in 
Russia, Romania and Belarus (Rodríguez-Pose & Krøijer 2009: 395). The Baltic 
countries, Poland and the Czech Republic have also made some progress in the 
area. Kazakhstan, Moldova and Slovakia have implemented more modest reforms. 
The general pattern of the assignment responsibilities in the region is that the local 
governments are responsible for refuse removal, water and sewage, and lower 
levels of education (Dunn & Wetzel 1999: 242). 
A major obstacle for decentralising reforms is the institutional weakness and 
the lack of administrative capacity found in many countries. As a consequence, 
most countries have found it difficult to establish local tax bases. The local 
revenue autonomy is thus still very weak (Dunn & Wetzel 1999: 243). 
Furthermore, the local governments are often very small and economic difficulties 
make them unable to hire enough administrative staff. The small size of the 
subnational governments also makes the localities weak actors vis-à-vis the 
central government (Bratic 2008: 149).   
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4 Method 
The objective of this study is to provide generalizable knowledge about how 
political and fiscal decentralisation affects newly democratised or developing non-
Western countries. There are several possible ways to study this, but for the stated 
purpose I have decided to use statistical methods, namely multiple regression 
analyses. In this chapter I discuss my methodological choices, define the 
population and present the variables used in the analysis.  
4.1 Multiple Regression Analysis 
To investigate the effects of decentralisation on democratic quality and political 
participation I use Ordinary Least Square (OLS) multiple regression analysis. 
Later in this chapter I discuss how the statistical models are designed. In this 
section I explain the advantages with the chosen method and some of the 
shortcomings. At the end of this section I discuss the limitations of cross-section 
data. 
Regression analysis is used to explain the changes in a dependent variable (the 
Y-variable) as a function of changes in a selection of independent variables (the 
X-variables). It is a practical tool to apply in studies of cause-and-effect because it 
can be used to show both the direction and the strength of the effect of a given 
independent variable (Studenmund 2005: 6-7). The perhaps most important reason 
why multiple regression analysis has become so widely used within the social 
sciences is its ability to handle multi causality, that is, the assumption that a 
phenomenon can be affected by several different causes (Djurfeldt 2009: 57). 
Most theories, if not every, assume the presence of multi causality, which makes 
regression analysis a particularly useful methodological tool. But it should be kept 
in mind that regression analyses alone can never prove causal effects; it can only 
be used to test the existence of significant quantitative relationships. For this 
reason, regression analyses should always be based on theoretical arguments 
(Studenmund 2005: 7). 
Statistical methods give the researcher the possibility to study a large number 
of cases simultaneously. The researcher can study the strength of causal effects, 
the likeliness that two or more variables affect each other, and investigate 
counterfactual conditions. At the same time, alternative hypothesis can be tested 
in the same study (Lieberman 2005: 238; Brady 2004: 57). There are also some 
limitations and pitfalls that should be acknowledged. For practical reasons, 
comparative studies usually apply wide concepts that are thought of as being 
universal. The risk of conceptual stretching is thus omnipresent in statistical 
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research, particularly when the researcher starts accepting observations for 
comparison on the basis that they appear “similar enough” (Sartori 1970: 1035). 
On the other hand, when too much detail is added in quantitative studies the 
researcher quickly “runs out of cases” (Lijphart 1971: 684). 
What this means is that statistical research has a difficulty of handling too 
much case-specific and varying information. In the present study, I have adopted 
broad conceptual understandings of the phenomenon decentralisation. 
Unavoidable, some information is lost in the process. Decentralisation is a 
multifaceted phenomenon and the speed, form and sequence of implementation 
varies between places. Case study methods have an advantage in this respect as 
they can account for more theoretical richness (Coppedge 1999: 475). There are in 
other words strengths and weaknesses of each approach and a fair conclusion is 
that they can be used to answer different types of research questions (George & 
Bennet 2005: 17). 
The guiding research question of the present study concerns the effects of a 
broad trend of fiscal and political reorganisation that has been present in all 
regions of the world. I argue that general knowledge, as opposed to anecdotal or 
case specific, could give important insights of the effects of local governance. As 
I show above, decentralisation is often marketed by international organisation 
based on general claims, such as its democratising potentials or abilities to 
improve government performance. Such claims should also be tested at a general 
level. 
The next question that I address regards the limitations of basing a study on 
cross-section data. A limitation with cross-section data is that it can only give a 
snapshot of how variables correlate. However, the question that I am investigating 
concerns a development over time. The lack of a time-dimension makes the 
results from the analysis more difficult to interpret. An important limitation – that 
I will get back to in the analysis – is to determine direction of causality. Causality 
between two variables implies that the cause comes before the effect. With cross-
section data, it is often hard to determine if X affects Y, or if a reverse causality is 
present. Sometimes the effects run in both directions, which might exaggerate the 
estimation of the effect. With time-series analysis this can be resolved by lagging 
the dependent variable to make sure that cause comes before effect (Teorell 2009: 
202-205). However, since the hypotheses are guided by theory, some of the 
complexity in regards to data limitations can be reduced by theoretical reasoning 
and comparisons with previous research. 
4.2 The Population 
The choice of population is based on the assumption presented above that 
decentralisation has different effects in a Western and a non-Western context. 
That decentralisation has different effects on developing and developed countries 
have has been shown in economic research (Davoodi & Zou 1998). It is also 
under debate whether the benefits of decentralisation can be reaped in countries 
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where democracy is not yet fully established (Martinez-Vazquez & McNab 2006: 
16). Consequently, the countries in the population are either developing countries, 
or countries that have recently experienced democratic transitions. I have 
deliberately chosen a wide definition of the population. I do not want to limit the 
study exclusively to new democracies since old but poor democracies, such as 
India, would fall outside this criterion for inclusion.  Neither do I want to restrict 
the study to developing countries. Many countries, such as South Korea, have 
experienced rapid economic development in the last few decades and would thus 
be excluded. That is also why I use the collective term “non-Western” as opposed 
to a more exact denomination. Each of the mentioned criteria demands some 
further elaboration. 
To begin with I should define what I mean with Western countries. According 
to my definition, the Western countries are all European countries in the former 
Western Bloc (including the neutral states). The definition also includes the 
United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. All others are thus defined as 
non-Western. Defining non-authoritarian states is more difficult. The reason why I 
want to exclude authoritarian states is that I believe that other factors determine 
political participation under authoritarian rule. Further, I cannot find any 
theoretical arguments to suggest that decentralisation causes democratic 
transitions. The remaining question is where to draw the line. In all research, 
avoiding selection biases is a critical point. But moving from a scale to a 
dichotomy includes the identification of cut-off points, which is always somewhat 
arbitrary. Bogaards (2012) has in a recent study critically assessed over 30 
different ways that have been used to separate democracies from non-
democracies. Although the understandings of democracy do not vary 
substantially, Bogaards concludes that there is a lack of consensus about where to 
draw the line (Ibid.: 691). For the present study, the purpose is to exclude all 
authoritarian states. The idea is to exclude countries like China, Belarus, Cuba and 
Eritrea where political and civil rights are severely restricted. The purpose is not 
to identify complete democracies, but rather to identify a point from where it no 
longer is meaningful to discuss the countries’ political systems in terms of 
democracy. Consequently, I will use a low breaking point. A common way to 
identify a threshold is to use the combined averaged score of Freedom House’s 
indices of civil liberties and political rights. The scale ranges from 1 to 7, where a 
high score indicates low levels of democracy (or freedom, which is the actual 
underlying concept). For broad samples of democracies, a threshold around 3,5 – 
5 is often used (Bogaards 2012: 695). For the present study I use 5 as a threshold 
in order to exclude all authoritarian regimes without the risk of also excluding 
some poorly functioning democracies.5 For obvious reasons, I also exclude 
microstates with less than one million citizens. The sample is presented in chapter 
5. In the remaining sections of this chapter I discuss the variables and their 
definitions. 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
5 This definition includes all countries labelled as free or partly free in Freedom House’s trichotomy.  
  26 
4.3 The Dependent Variables 
 
4.3.1 Political Participation 
Political participation is the dependent variable that I use to test the first 
hypothesis. In this study, political participation is operationalized in two separate 
ways: voter turnout in national elections and non-electoral participation. 
Voting in elections is perhaps the easiest way to participate in politics in a 
democracy. It is also an indicator of citizens’ desire to be politically represented 
(Lijphart 2012: 283). Voter turnout is in the present study seen primarily as an 
indicator of political participation. It is based on the assumption that active and 
politically aware citizens care about their political representation. 
In conformity with previous research, voter turnout is operationalized as 
percentage of votes of the total voting-age population (Lijphart 2012: 283). This is 
generally regarded as the most reliable method of measuring voter turnout. An 
alternative is to measure voter turnout as percentage of registered voters. The 
problem with this measurement is that the statistics on registered voters are 
sometimes inaccurate and in some cases they are not used at all. Furthermore, in 
some countries the system used to register voters is faulty, which makes the 
voting age population a better point of comparison to gauge the true turnout 
figures (IDEA 2014a). In many cases, electoral participation differs between 
parliamentary and presidential elections. To get the most accurate and comparable 
data on voter turnout, I use the national election that has the highest turnout 
numbers for each country.  
I have chosen to use voter turnout in national elections, as opposed to local 
elections, for two reasons. First, national elections generate better conditions for 
comparisons as the voting procedures and voting days for local elections in many 
cases diverge. I would also have to exclude all the countries in the sample that do 
not hold local elections. Second, reliable data are more accessible at the national 
level, which facilitates comparisons. To my knowledge, there is no international 
database for local elections. 
The main advantage with voter-turnout as a measurement of political 
participation is the reliability of the data and the accessibility to data over a long 
period of time. There are also empirical findings from Western countries to 
suggest that decentralisation has lead to increased voter turnout in local elections 
(Michelsen et al. 2014; Blais et al. 2011). A disadvantage is, however, that voter-
turnout alone is a somewhat crude measurement of participation, and it does not 
account for the various forms of exercising influence between elections. In 
addition to improving representation, decentralisation can also improve the 
possibilities for direct political participation. This is one of the core arguments for 
bringing government closer to the citizens. Consequently, I also include a variable 
for non-electoral participation in the study. 
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As mentioned in the first chapter, citizen participation and social capital are 
similar concepts, but should not be confused as synonyms. In this study, I rely on 
Putnam’s (1995) distinction between social capital as referring to citizens’ 
relations among themselves, and political participation as the interaction between 
citizens and political institutions. Memberships in sport clubs or participation in 
choirs can surely be both fulfilling at an individual level and have positive effects 
on society, but are of lesser relevance for this particular study. My definition of 
political participation is collective actions that, in one way or another, strive to 
affect society or political institutions. Participation in political movements with 
broad agendas, and participation in campaigns or organisations with focus on 
single issues are considered as equally important. The form of participation can be 
either direct, by participating in campaigns and demonstrations, and indirect by 
membership in organisations.  
Due to lack of data, non-electoral participation is considerably more difficult 
to operationalize than voter turnout, especially in cross-country comparisons. 
However, since the 1990s comparative survey data on political behaviour in 
various countries have become available. I have decided to base the 
operationalization of non-electoral participation on survey data from the World 
Values Survey. In contrast to many other providers of survey data with regional 
foci, World Value Surveys has a global scope and provides data from all world 
regions. Unfortunately, data are not available for all the countries in the sample. In 
order to reduce the number of missing cases, I use data from three waves of 
surveys (wave four, five and six). The time period stretches from 2001 to 2014. 
From the cross-section survey data, I have created an additive index of 
participation consisting of seven variables. The index takes into account both 
direct participation (through demonstrations, signing of petitions and participation 
in boycotts) and indirect participation through membership in organisations with 
political agendas (political parties, labour unions, environmental organisations and 
humanitarian organisations). A limitation with these data is that I cannot 
determine frequency of engagement in political activities. 
4.3.2 Level of Democracy 
Conceptualising democracy is always tricky business. Some prefer to see it as a 
dichotomous variable (e.g. Huntington 1991; przeworski et al. 1996; Sartori 
1991), while others prefer to measure it on a scale (e.g. Teorell 2010; Dahl 1989; 
Bollen & Jackman 1989). This disagreement about measurement is to some extent 
(with noteworthy exceptions) part of a general division between scholars from 
qualitative and quantitative research traditions. The division is important since the 
different approaches also affect the researchers’ conclusions from studies of 
democratisation (Collier & Adcock 1999: 538). 
Collier and Adcock (1999) recommend a pragmatic approach to the 
conceptualisation of democracy. They argue that the choice of measurement 
should be guided by the purposes of the study. Dichotomies have the important 
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advantage of providing clear cut-points, while the use of scales is more suitable to 
capture continuous concepts. 
For the purposes of my study, being able to compare degree of democracy is 
essential. The hypothesis that decentralisation affects democratic quality is based 
on the assumption that democracy is a continuous concept – not an all-or-nothing 
affair. Consequently, the use of a graded scale is necessary to be able to test my 
hypothesis. Nevertheless, as I discuss above, I also apply a cut-point where I 
exclude all authoritarian states. In other words, the population is defined 
according to a dichotomy where I separate authoritarian and non-authoritarian 
states. Thereafter I use a scale to determine degree of democracy in each non-
authoritarian country. Since I have decided to measure democracy as a scale, the 
following question is which scale to use. 
There are several indices of democracy. The two most commonly used are 
those provided by Freedom House and Polity IV. Freedom House’s index of 
democracy, Freedom in the World, is published annually. The index dates back to 
1973 and is based on the combined average score of political rights and civil 
liberties on a scale ranging from 1 to 7. Polity IV goes back to the year 1800. The 
index uses four component variables that are scored on a scale for democracy and 
autocracy. A variable for regulation of participation, scored on the autocracy scale 
only, is also included in the index. The autocracy score is then subtracted from the 
democracy score and calculated on a scale of -10 to 10 (Boogards 2012: 691, 
695). Both indices are widely used is studies of democracy, and there is an on-
going debate about which measurement that provides the most accurate 
democracy score. 
A problematic issue with the absence of a single common measurement of 
democracy is that the findings in some cases depend on measurement. Although 
highly correlated, when applied in empirical research the indices often generate 
different results (Högström 2013). In an assessment of the different measures of 
democracy, Hadenius and Teorell (2004) find that Freedom House has a tendency 
to underrate the level of democracy due to overemphasis on repression and 
violence. Polity IV, on the other hand, tend to overrate the democracy score for 
the opposite reasons. The authors also find that a combination of the two indices 
generates the most accurate score in relation to an independent yardstick. Based 
on these findings, I use Hadenius and Teorell’s combined democracy index, 
which is measured on a scale from 1 to 10. 
4.4 The Independent Variables 
4.4.1 Decentralisation 
Decentralisation is a relative concept with a multitude of dimensions. A single 
measurement cannot truly encompass all the political, administrative and 
economic aspects of the phenomenon. A number of different ways to measure 
decentralisation exist, which has created conceptual confusion (Riedl & 
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Dickovick 2013; Harbers 2010). As a result, researchers have in the last years 
called for a more integrated approach where the various dimensions of 
decentralisation are studied together (Smoke 2003: 8). For the purposes of this 
study, I have decided to divide the variable into two separate operationalizations: 
a political and a fiscal. This solution has the advantage of providing indicators for 
the power relations between different levels of governments, local government 
autonomy, and the citizens’ relation to their local politicians. My 
operationalizations are in accordance with most previous research on comparative 
decentralisation. Schneider’s (2003) article on the different indicators of 
decentralisation has been particularly useful. 
The most common way to measure fiscal decentralisation is by observing the 
expenditure outlays and the fiscal revenues at subnational levels of government. 
The data are collected from the International Monetary Fond’s Government 
Finance Statistic Yearbook (GFSY). IMF is the organisation that provides the 
most complete comparative data on spending, grant transfers and collection of tax 
revenues on different tiers of government. Decentralisation is relative, and to 
measure the power relations the subnational fiscal power has to be put in relation 
to a higher level of government. In accordance with previous research (e.g. Oates 
1985; Harbers 2010; Davoodi & Zou: 1998) I calculate the subnational revenues 
and expenditures in relation to the general governments’6 revenues and 
expenditures. An alternative approach applied elsewhere is to compare 
subnational revenues and expenses to GDP (Schneider 2003: 37). This would 
capture a slightly different aspect of the subnational governments relative 
positions. However, I argue that subnational revenue and expenditure shares in 
proportion to the general government better mirror the power relation, since the 
size of government and the public sector varies between different countries, which 
makes cross-country comparisons less accurate (Rodden 2002: 675). 
Unfortunately, there are some reliability and validity problems in relation to 
the data that should be considered. One of the problems in regards to reliability is 
that all data are self-reported. This means that there is a risk that different 
countries classify revenues or expenditures differently (Schneider 2003: 36). In 
terms of validity, another issue is the inability to differentiate between earmarked 
and non-earmarked grants (Harbers 2010: 614). The consequence of this is that 
the local fiscal autonomy in countries where the local governments do not rely on 
own tax revenues is sometimes overestimated (Rodden 2002: 675). A final 
problem with the GFSY is that the data are not complete, and many countries do 
not report revenues and expenses at subnational levels of government. I get back 
to this issue in section 4.1, where I discuss some of the issues that the missing 
cases causes for the representativeness of the sample. 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
6 The general government sector consists of all units of government on the central, state or local level. All non-
market non-profit institutions (NPIs) controlled by government and all social security funds are also included in 
this definition (System of National Accounts 2008: 80). 
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On IMF’s webpage, GFS data for the last three years are publicly available. 
But these data are often incomplete, and I have therefor primarily relied on the 
printed editions of the GFSY from 2012 and earlier years.  
Political decentralisation refers to the local governments’ political autonomy 
from the centre and the citizens’ relation to their local politicians. Recalling the 
definition presented in chapter 1, political decentralisation is defined as the 
“establishment or reestablishment of elected autonomous subnational 
governments capable of making binding decisions in at least some policy areas” 
(Willis et al. 1999: 8). According to this definition, there are two central criteria 
that should be met for a decentralised local government. First, the politicians 
should be elected through democratic elections. Second, the local governments 
should be autonomous. Hence, the variable for political decentralisation shows 
both how citizens relate to their local politicians, and how the local governments 
relate to higher government entities. To meet these conditions, the local 
governments should elect their legislative and executive politicians in democratic 
elections. It is important that both conditions are met. In many countries, local 
elections for the legislative branch are held at local level, while the executive is 
appointed from a higher level of government. In these scenarios, the local 
governments have limited autonomy and should not be considered as fully 
decentralised. For instance, Latin America has a long history of local 
governments. But these governments were generally weak and the mayors were 
centrally appointed (Prud’homme 2003: 17). A similar pattern could be seen in 
Africa in the early post-colonial era (Edoun 2012: 100). It would be misleading to 
suggest that these local governments represented any substantial independent 
political power. Consequently, according to the applied operationalizations the 
real transition to a decentralised system of governments in Latin America took 
place in the 1980s and 1990s, which is more accurate. 
The data on political decentralisation are collected from the World Bank’s 
Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al. 2001). The statistics refer to the 
year 2012 and the variable is measured as a dummy in the analysis. The data are 
unfortunately not complete. In order to keep the number of missing cases to a 
minimum I have updated the data and covered some of the missing cases. Some of 
the data are collected from the Inter American Dialogue’s overview of Latin 
American electoral systems, provided by the Political Database of the Americas 
(2014). For the non-Latin countries, I have done individual searches, primarily 
based on information from the electoral commissions’ webpages for the individual 
countries. As with fiscal decentralisation, my operationalization is in line with 
previous research (Schneider 2003; Harbers 2010). All the main variables for the 
analysis are now introduced. The next step is to select relevant control variables. 
4.5 Control Variables 
One of the main advantages with quantitative methods is the ability to control for 
alternative explanations in the analysis. The researcher should, however, select the 
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control variables with caution; only variables with clear theoretical grounding can 
be included in the analysis. Poorly justified variables risk rendering the analysis 
less reliable (Lieberman 2005: 438). However, it is also crucial not to leave out 
any causal variable, as it would lead to omitted variable bias (King et al. 1994: 
61-62). What follows is an exposition of the variables used as controls in the 
analyses. Much of the data, albeit not all, are taken from the Quality of 
Government dataset. All details about the variables and the data sources can be 
found in the appendix. 
4.5.1 Reasons to Participate 
To recapitulate: participation in the present study is defined as voter turnout in 
national elections, and citizens’ direct or indirect non-electoral engagement in 
politics. In this section I discuss each of them separately and decide on the 
relevant control variables to include in the analysis. I begin with an overview of 
the factors that according to previous research affect voter turnout.  
There is a large body of literature on what motivates voters to show up at the 
ballot box on election day. The literature either focuses on what influences the 
voters at an individual level to vote, or what determines voter turnout at an 
aggregated level in cross-country studies. Since I am comparing countries, and not 
individuals, only the factors that have an impact on an aggregated level will be 
included in the analysis. 
Many of the countries in the sample have mandatory voting laws. Compulsory 
voting is a factor that stimulates higher voter turnout. In previous research, 
compulsory voting is usually included as a control variable in studies of electoral 
participation (e.g. Lijphart 1999: 285; Persson 2012; Fornos et al. 2004). I 
consequently include compulsory voting as the first control variable in the model. 
It should be noted that the extent to which mandatory voting laws are enforced 
vary between countries. The effect can therefor differ according to how strictly 
the laws are enforced (IDEA 2014b). 
Previous research shows that level of education is strongly correlated to voter 
turnout at an individual level. The nature of this relation is, however, subject to 
debate. New research suggests that education level should be seen as a proxy for 
social status. According to this view, education alone has no significant effect on 
individuals’ voting behaviour. Instead, education can lead to higher social status 
for the individual, which in turn makes him or her more likely to take part in 
elections. This hypothesis has also been confirmed in empirical studies of 
industrialised countries (Persson 2012). These findings provide a tentative 
solution to the puzzle why increased levels of education in western countries have 
not been accompanied by rising levels of voter turnout (e.g. Pelkonen 2012; 
Franklin 2004). Furthermore, if education is only a proxy for social status there 
should be no reasons to believe that the aggregated level of education has any 
significance on voter turnout. 
However, education and illiteracy rates can also be seen as indicators of 
socioeconomic development, which is widely believed to affect turnout in 
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elections (Fornos et al. 2004: 912). Socioeconomic factors are likely to be 
particularly important in the present study, given the wide sample of countries on 
different levels of development. Studies on voter turnout are typically conducted 
in an American or Western European context, where socioeconomic factors 
arguably are of less important than in, for instance, Africa. Since more developed 
countries tend to have higher voter turnout figures (Lijphart 1999: 285), I also 
include GDP per capita as a control variable.  
Constitutional settings and voting systems can also affect turnout in elections. 
Lijphart (1999) finds a strongly significant positive connection between consensus 
models of democracy (usually referred to as proportional democracy) and voter 
turnout. According to his study of 37 countries, the countries that apply consensus 
democracy have on average 7.3 % higher turnout numbers than majoritarian 
systems (Lijphart 1999: 285-6). Proportional electoral systems should therefor 
also be controlled for. 
A final variable to control for is corruption. Corruption can affect democracy 
in various ways. In a recent study, it is found that high levels of corruption tend to 
depress voter turnout (Stockemer et al. 2011). To conclude, the controls for voter 
turnout are compulsory voting, education level, GDP per capita, electoral system 
(proportional or majoritarian) and corruption. 
Compared to electoral participation, non-electoral participation is more 
difficult to study statistically because it is considerably more difficult to quantify. 
Not surprisingly, there are also fewer studies made on non-electoral participation 
in cross-country analyses and less previous research to rely on when deciding on 
relevant control variables. However, socioeconomic factors are likely to affect 
voter turnout, as well as non-electoral participation. In more developed countries 
where citizens have access to education they are arguably better informed about 
the political issues and more apt to participate politically. Moreover, in developed 
countries, the citizens are in a better economic situation and have more leisure 
time to their disposal (Fornos et al. 2004: 912). It is also probable that high levels 
of corruption create more apathetic citizens. Furthermore, evidence from Africa 
show that ethnic divisions tend to create lower levels of trust among citizens and 
make them less willing to contribute to financing public goods that benefit other 
ethnic groups, which has a negative impact on the tax compliance (Lassen 2007: 
423). For the same reason, ethnic fractionalisation could also be expected to 
hamper the likelihood for collective political actions; free rider problems and spill 
over effects are common phenomena in most types of political participation. In 
sum, the control variable in the second model is GDP per capita, years in 
education, corruption, and ethnic fractionalization. 
4.5.2  Determinants of Democratisation 
A central claim that has been used by donor organisations and organisations for 
economic cooperation in their effort to promote decentralising reforms is that 
decentralisation improves democratic quality. The third hypothesis deals with this 
issue. There is a wide range of literature in comparative politics concerned with 
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the contextual conditions that facilitate democratic transitions and consolidation. 
The control variables are drawn from the field of democratisation theory, in 
particular from Teorell (2010) and Barro (1999), which are two major statistical 
studies in recent years. 
In 1959 Seymour Martin Lipset published one of the most influential articles 
on democratisation. In the article, Lipset hypothesised that a series of economic 
conditions, historic factors and values constituted requisites for the establishment 
of stable democracies. The main argument can be summarised in a short sentence: 
“the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain 
democracy” (1959: 75). The question about the nature of the relationship between 
economic modernisation and democracy has generated considerable amount of 
scientific attention. Over time, the access to better data and more sophisticated 
statistical methods has facilitated research on the subject (Diamond 2006: 676). 
Some of Lipset’s findings have been confirmed in later studies; others have been 
proven false. But most importantly, a vast amount of new factors have been added 
to the list of variables that affect democracy and democratisation. 
Historical factors, and factors that deal with religion or the population 
structure are commonly discussed in regards to their effect on democracy. Seeing 
that the sample consists of numerous former colonies a relevant first question to 
answer is whether colonial heritage affects the prospects for democracy. Contrary 
to what one might suspect, colonial heritage does not seem to be a decisive factor. 
This is confirmed in both Barro’s and Teorell’s analyses where the variable turns 
out insignificant (Barro 1999: 174-75; Teorell 2010: 45). The empirical findings 
suggest that colonial heritage is not a relevant variable in explaining democratic 
quality and will thus not be included in the analysis. 
When it comes to religion, Barro and Teorell find that the previous held belief 
that Christian countries are more liable to be democratic cannot be confirmed 
statistically. However, a large Muslim population is highly negatively correlated 
with democracy. This correlation is found in both studies but is difficult to 
interpret theoretically. Whether the connection is due to the religion in itself, or 
has to do with the linkage between church and state in Muslim countries, or if is 
just a regional characteristic (an Arab gap rather than a Muslim gap) is hard to tell 
(Barro 1999: 176-77; Teorell 2010: 45-50). Regardless of the causal mechanism 
of the correlation, I include a control variable for Muslim population. 
 As discussed in the theoretic section of the present thesis, there is a tentative 
connection between country size and democracy. In control for socioeconomic 
factors, Barro finds no significant connection between the variables. However, 
with a larger sample, Teorell finds a significant negative relation, meaning that 
small states are likely to be more democratic (Teorell 2010: 46). Size should 
therefor be controlled for. 
The second group of variables that I want to control for is indicators for 
socioeconomic development. In accordance to what Lipset and other have 
previously claimed, socioeconomic factors are according to Teorell and Barro’s 
findings connected with democratisation. I will consequently control for GDP per 
capita. Also, oil dependency is in both studies negatively connected with 
democracy and will accordingly be controlled for (Barro 1999: 167; Teorell 2010: 
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76). To conclude, the present study will include control variables for Muslim 
population, size, GDP per capita and oil dependency. Since all the different 
variables now are decided, the following step is the analysis.  
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5 Analysis 
In this chapter I present and discuss the findings from the statistical analysis. The 
present study is guided by three hypotheses regarding the democratic and political 
benefits of decentralisation. Now the time has come to test them. The chapter 
unfolds in three main parts, in which the hypotheses are tested in turn and 
according to the discussed operationalizations. The findings are then discussed 
and interpreted in the final section of this chapter. Before I get to the main 
analysis, I will present the sample of countries. 
5.1 The Sample 
The selection of countries in the sample is based on the definition of the 
population presented in section 3.2. To recapitulate, the population consists of 
non-Western and non-authoritarian countries in the four world regions reviewed. 
All countries are either developing or have recently experienced democratic 
transitions. I have decided to work with a complete sample, which means that 
every country in the population that has available data is added to the sample. The 
sample amounts to 69 countries in total. Each of these countries has data for at 
least one of the applied definitions of decentralisation. There is, however, a 
problem of missing cases, which I discuss presently. In table 1, the complete 
sample is displayed. The countries are sorted according to their regional location. 
The old Soviet republics in Central Asia have been placed together with the CEE 
countries. 
 
Table 1 Asia Latin 
America 
Africa CEE 
 Bangladesh Argentina Benin Albania 
 India Bolivia Burundi Armenia 
 Lebanon Brazil Ghana Bosnia 
Herzegovina 
 Kuwait Chile Guinea Bulgaria 
 Malaysia Colombia Kenya Croatia 
 Mongolia Costa Rica Lesotho Estonia 
 Nepal Dominican 
Republic 
Mali Georgia 
 
 Pakistan Ecuador Malawi Hungary 
 Papua New 
Guinea* 
El Salvador Mauritius Kyrgyz 
Republic 
 Philippines Guatemala Morocco Latvia 
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 Sri Lanka Haiti Mozambique Lithuania 
 South Korea Honduras Nigeria Macedonia 
 Thailand Mexico Sierra Leone Poland 
  Nicaragua South Africa Rumania 
  Panama Tanzania Serbia 
  Paraguay Togo Slovakia 
  Peru Uganda Slovenia  
  Uruguay Zambia Turkey 
  Venezuela  Ukraine 
 n = 13 n = 19 n = 18 n = 19 
* Papua New Guinea is included in the sample, even though it is located in the Oceanian part 
of the South West Pacific Ocean.  
 
As seen in table 1, each region is represented comparatively well in the sample. 
Unfortunately, the data are not completely overlapping. The data on political 
decentralisation covers 65 of the 69 countries. The data on fiscal decentralisation 
is, however, only available for 39 of the countries. Missing cases are always 
problematic, especially if they are systematic. Systematic errors in the selection 
process can create biases that affect the causal inferences drawn from a study 
(Collier & Mahoney 1996: 59). 
Thus, a relevant question to ask is if the missing cases are random, or if they 
follow a pattern. In Latin America there is data for fiscal decentralisation for 10 
out of 19 countries. Among the CEE countries, including the old Soviet republics 
in Central Asia listed in table 1, 18 of 19 countries are covered. Unfortunately, the 
corresponding figure is 4 of 13 in Asia, and 7 out of 18 in Africa. Asia and Africa 
are in other words underrepresented in the sample, while the EEC countries are 
overrepresented. In addition to this obvious pattern, there might be other biases 
that are less evident.7 The data are, as mentioned earlier, self reported which 
indicates that there might be an element of self-selection in the sample. This is a 
recurring problem in statistical research (George & Bennet 2005: 23). The fact 
that the missing cases follow a regional pattern could affect the results from the 
analysis, and this should be kept in mind in the following sections. 
A vast majority of the countries are developing countries. Only 4 of the 69 
countries are included on IMF’s list of advance economies. Most countries have 
also undergone democratic transitions in recent time. According to Huntington’s 
definitions (1991: 14), 25 of the countries democratised during the third wave of 
democratisation. 4 were already democracies since earlier waves, and the rest are 
not mentioned.8 In the sample, 41 countries are politically decentralised and 24 
are not. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
7 Patterns according to wealth, democracy level or degree of decentralisation are some possibilities.  
8 Most likely since they had not yet democratised at the time of the publication of Huntington’s book in 1991. 
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5.2 Decentralisation and Political Participation 
The link between local governance and citizen participation is one of the core 
theoretical arguments that have motivated decentralisation. This connection is 
what makes decentralisation normatively appealing; citizen engagement in politics 
is a central tenet of the participatory model of democracy, where the people learn 
to be democratic citizens by participation (Hudson 2010: 15). As I have discussed 
above, the connection has strong theoretical importance also for the economic 
arguments of decentralisation. A participating citizenship works in two ways. 
First, it exposes the citizens’ preferences to the local policy-makers, which allows 
them to tailor the provision of public goods in accordance to the public demand 
(Finot 2002: 137). Second, active citizens can provide a check on local politicians 
and can thus improve accountability of the local governments (Boadway & 
Tremblay 2012: 1071). However, there are also dangers connected with 
decentralisation. It may cause increased levels of corruption, jeopardise stability 
and make government less efficient (Prud’homme 1995).  
In figure 1, the relationship between fiscal decentralisation and voter turnout is 
shown in a scatterplot.  
 
In accordance with H1, the regression line in figure 1 has a positive slope. This 
indicates that high levels of fiscal decentralisation correspond with high levels of 
voter turnout in national elections, both measured in percentages. But the slope is 
not very steep, and the scatterplot does not display any clear pattern. This 
indicates that the correlation is not very strong, and probably not significant. 
Figure 2 shows the correlation between fiscal decentralisation and non-electoral 
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participation. Interestingly, this is also in line with H2, which states that 
decentralisation correlates with non-electoral participation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I use an OLS regression analysis based on cross section data to test my 
hypotheses. The results are shown in table 2. As is shown in table 2, I test the 
effects of the two opererationalizations of decentralisation in a total of four 
models. When both variables for decentralisation are included in the same models, 
the amount of missing cases increase because the data are not completely 
overlapping. Therefor I have decided to analyse them separately in two models for 
each dependent variable. Some of the previous research use a logarithmic 
measurement of fiscal decentralisation. The R2 is in general higher when the non-
logarithmic form is used (the only notable difference in model 4, table 1), which is 
why these models are displayed in the tables. But since the results do vary 
according to the applied measurement, I have also included alternative models in 
the appendix. 
I have used the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) to check for multicollinearity 
in all models, including those in table 3 in the following section. The VIF-test is 
used to detect to how much multicollinearity increases the variance of an 
estimated coefficient. Each independent variable has a VIF-value, and 5 is often 
used as the critical value (Studenmund 2005: 258-9). None of the variables in the 
model has a VIF-value that exceeds 4, which indicates that severe 
multicollinearity is most likely not present in the models. A second thing to 
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control for is the presence of heteroskedasticity in the models. Heteroskedasticity 
means that the distributed variance in the error terms is not constant for all 
observations (Studenmund 2005: 346). I have used a visualisation approach to test 
this in scatterplots with the standardised residual and the standardised predicted 
value.9 I see no sign of heteroskedasticity in any of the models. 
 
Table 2 (1) 
 
Voter 
turnout 
(2) 
 
Voter 
turnout 
(3) 
 
Political 
participation 
(4) 
 
Political 
participation 
Political 
decentralisation 
9,108** 
(4,304) 
– -8,582 
(14,358) 
– 
Fiscal 
decentralisation 
– ,015 
(,147) 
– ,924*      
(,472) 
Compulsory 
voting 
15,666*** 
(4,600) 
14,501*** 
(4,930) 
– – 
Years in 
education 
1,174 
(,977) 
,625 
(1,085) 
-5,361* 
(3,016) 
-1,365      
(3,106) 
(Log) GDP per 
capita 
-4,180 
(3,271) 
7,105 
(4,504) 
-18,946      
(11,881) 
-15,067        
(15,881) 
Ethnic 
fractionalisation 
– – -7,477 
(32,140) 
33,347 
(44,133) 
Corruption 
perceptions 
,335 
(1,977) 
-3,758 
(2,536) 
8,589   
(6,002) 
9,756      
(7,288) 
Proportional 
representation 
3,946 
(4,868) 
-1,428 
(5,941) 
– – 
     
Constant 76,049 
(20,147) 
58,753 
(11,597) 
276,995 
(89,485) 
147,813 
(138,168) 
R2 ,302 ,352 ,353 ,314 
Number of 
observations 
62 37 38 24 
Beta values displayed in the table. Standard errors presented in parentheses. 
 *** significant at 99 %, ** significant at 95 %, * significant at 90 %. 
 
In model 1, the correlation between political decentralisation and voter turnout 
in national election is tested. Political decentralisation is coded as dummy variable 
where 0 = not politically decentralised, and 1 = politically decentralised. The 
results from model 1 show interesting findings. In accordance with previous 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
9 A major limitation of SPSS, which is the statistical software I use, is that there is no menu driven approach to 
test for the presence of heteroskedasticity, which is why I have not been able to test it in a statistically significant 
way. 
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literature, compulsory voting has a strong positive effect on voter turnout in 
national elections. The Beta value indicates that turnout is at an average around 15 
% higher in countries that practise mandatory voting. The connection is 
significant at the 99 % level. The risk that the connection is due to chance is in 
other words very small. But what is more interesting for the present study, 
political decentralisation is also highly significant connected to voter turnout. The 
Beta value is positive, which indicates that the presence of local governments 
where the officials are locally elected is correlated with higher electoral 
participation. I will discuss this finding presently. Before that I should point out 
that both indicators of socioeconomic development, GDP per capita and years in 
education, are insignificant in the model. In fact, GDP has a negative effect on 
electoral turnout (a negative correlation between GDP and participation is also 
present in model 2 and 3). This remains true when I test alternative GDP 
measurements.10 Proportional representation is positively correlated with voter 
turnout. But this connection is far from significant. Neither is corruption. The 
number of cases in the model is 62, and the R2 is ,302, meaning that about 30 % of 
the variability can be explained in the model (Studenmund 2005: 50).  
When tested alone, political decentralisation is significant at the 99 % level. 
The correlation remains the same in control for mandatory voting laws, but is 
pushed down to the 95 % significance level when proportional representation is 
introduced. The correlation remains at the same level of significance in control for 
socioeconomic conditions and corruption. The effect on voter turnout is strong. 
Holding the other variables equal, political decentralisation causes in average 
more than 9 % higher electoral participation. Based on these findings, I accept H1 
and reject the null hypothesis. 
How should this correlation be interpreted? According to the theoretical 
argumentation presented above, the correlation between political decentralisation 
and voter turnout could be interpreted as evidence that local government causes 
higher citizen participation, which is translated into high turnout figures in 
national elections. This would be in line with the arguments used for the 
promotion of decentralisation and should be good news for its proponents. A 
tentative theoretical explanation of the causal mechanism is that decentralisation 
brings government closer to the people and improves political representation. The 
improved possibilities to influence public policies create more active and 
politically aware citizens that are more likely to vote in elections. 
There are also some empirical evidence from Europe to support the idea that 
decentralisation can have positive impacts on voter turnout. Research on the 
effects of decentralisation in Germany has shown that states with decentralised 
government structures have higher voter turnout figures in municipal elections 
(Michelsen et al. 2014). In Spain, there is evidence that decentralisation has 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
10 I use a GDP measurement from the World Bank that is calculated with purchasing power parity (PPP) 
exchange rates in the analysis. I argue that this is a more accurate indicator of the socioeconomic conditions in 
the different countries. No major changes occur in model one when GDP per capita expressed in US dollars 
provided by IMF is used instead. 
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caused higher voter turnout in regional elections (Blais et al. 2011). The findings 
from the present study suggest that decentralisation correlates with high levels of 
electoral participation in national elections. 
However, with cross-section data it is difficult to determine the direction of 
the causal arrows. As I have discussed above, a clear limitation of cross-section 
data is the inferiority when it comes to determining directions of causal 
relationships. There is a risk for a reversed causal correlation, or that the 
relationship works in both directions, which might exaggerate the effect. An 
alternative explanation for the correlation could be that the citizens in countries 
with high degrees of electoral participation care more about their political 
representation. This in turn causes higher demands for local representation, which 
makes political decentralisation more likely. In other words, high turnout figures 
could cause decentralisation rather than the other way around. Based on these 
data, it is not possible to draw any certain conclusions. But based on the 
theoretical literature, I argue that it is more likely that decentralisation affects 
turnout than the opposite. 
In the second model the number of cases drops to 37. Table 2 shows that 
compulsory voting is still highly significantly correlated with voter turnout. There 
is, however, no significant correlation between fiscal decentralisation and turnout. 
The variables are far from significantly correlated alone and the p-value becomes 
even less significant when the control variables are added. None of the other 
control variables are significantly correlated with voter turnout in this model 
either. 
According to the findings, there is no reason to believe that higher degrees of 
fiscal decentralisation cause higher levels of political participation in terms of 
voter turnout in national elections for the selected population of countries. Caution 
should however be taken, considering the number of missing cases and the 
previously discussed risks for a selection bias in the sample. To sum up the results 
from H1: my findings suggest that decentralisation affects voter turnout. However, 
in the statistical analysis I can only find support for a correlation between political 
decentralisation and voter turnout. Fiscal decentralisation seems not to affect 
turnout numbers in national elections in the population. 
H2 states that decentralisation affects non-electoral participation. Hence, in the 
remaining models, non-electoral political participation is the dependent variable. 
Since data for non-electoral political participation are collected from surveys from 
different years, I have tried to match the data for fiscal decentralisation as closely 
to the surveyed year as possible for each country. Model three shows a negative 
correlation between political decentralisation and political participation. This is 
the opposite of what H2 states, and means that non-electoral political participation 
is lower in countries with local democratic governments. The correlation has a p-
value of ,057 when tested alone, but when controls for socioeconomic conditions 
are introduced, the significant correlation disappears which suggests that the 
variables are not causally connected. What is surprising in the model is that both 
socioeconomic indicators are negatively correlated to participation. Tested alone, 
both GDP per capita and years in education are significant at the 99 % level, but 
when added in the same model only years in education remains weakly 
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significant. The model suggests that socioeconomic conditions affects level of 
participation. Why the correlation is negative is difficult to explain. 
Finally, model 4 shows a very interesting correlation between fiscal 
decentralisation and political participation. In accordance with the hypothesis, the 
correlation is positive. The correlation is not significant when tested alone, but in 
control for either variable for socioeconomic conditions or the variable for 
corruption, the p-value drops to a significant level. The number of cases in this 
model is unfortunately quite small and the connection between the variables is not 
very strong (significant at the 90 % level). 
To conclude, the results from the analysis show a correlation between 
decentralisation and electoral as well as non-electoral participation, depending on 
definition. The correlations are present even in the control of other relevant 
factors. However, the discussed data limitations make the findings less than 
certain. Nevertheless, the findings give some empirical support for both H1 and 
H2. These findings, combined with the extensive theoretical literature bring me to 
the conclusion that, in general, countries in the sample with more decentralised 
government also tend to have more politically active citizens. 
5.3 Decentralisation and Democratic Quality 
The promotion of decentralisation in developing countries is often done in 
reference to its democratising potentials. As explained in previous chapters, 
decentralisation can provide checks on central government and increase the 
citizens’ abilities to hold politicians accountable. Some scholars also argue that 
decentralising reforms is a way for larger countries to mimic the conditions that 
exist in small countries, where democracy has been more likely to take root 
(Diamond & Tsalik 1999). Competition between jurisdictions could also 
encourage good practises (Brennan & Buchanan 2000: 209). Hence, democratic 
quality should according to this logic be expected to be higher in countries with 
decentralised fiscal and political structures. However, the benefits from 
decentralisation also hinge on the local governments’ ability to keep the local elite 
from capturing the process, leading to decentralised corruption rather than more 
inclusive government (Prud’homme 1995), and central government’s ability to 
prevent local governments from abusing the opportunities to raid the fiscal 
commons (Oates 2005: 354). 
Before I proceed with the analysis, a word of caution should be added in 
regards to the tentative presence of a correlation between decentralisation and 
democracy. A bidirectional relationship between decentralisation and democracy 
has been found in a previous study (Martinez-Vazquez & McNab 2006). As I 
show in chapter 3, decentralisation has in many countries been a part of the 
transition to democracy. There is in other words a possibility that degree of 
democracy affects the level of decentralisation, as well as decentralisation affects 
democracy. As I have discussed, if variables affect each other in both directions, 
the effect of the correlation could be exaggerated. 
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Figure 3 shows how democracy and decentralisation relate. Recall that 
democracy is measured on a scale from 1 to 10, where a high value indicates good 
democratic quality. Fiscal decentralisation is still measured in percentages. The 
slope of the regression line is positive, which indicates that fiscal decentralised 
countries tend to be more democratic. However, no clear pattern is visible in the 
scatterplot and at a first sight the variables do not seem to be correlated. 
The results from the multiple regression analysis are displayed in table 3. In 
the first model GDP, Muslim population and oil production are highly correlated 
with democracy. The findings confirm the results from previous research on 
democratisation. The level of GDP positively affects the level of democracy, 
while a large Muslim population or large oil industry have depressing effects. 
Political decentralisation is positively correlated with democracy when tested 
alone. The correlation is significant at the 95 % level even in control for oil 
production or population size, but disappears when controlled for GDP per capita 
or Muslim population, which shows that the correlation is not causal. 
The pattern is not much different in the second model. GDP per capita and 
size of Muslim population is still highly significant. The effect of oil production is 
still negative, but no longer significant. Fiscal decentralisation is not correlated 
with democracy on its own, and this does not change when the control variables 
are added to the model. The effect of fiscal decentralisation appears to be weak 
and the correlation is even negative. The R2 value is at ,710, which indicates that 
the model explains most of the variability. Since none of the measurements of 
decentralisation appears to have an affect on democratic quality I can reject H3. 
This is also true when the two democracy indices are applied separately, instead 
of the combined index used in this study. 
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Table 3 (1) 
 
Freedom House/ 
Polity IV 
(2) 
 
Freedom House/ 
Polity IV 
Political 
decentralisation 
,003            
(2,329) 
– 
Fiscal 
decentralisation 
– -,010             
(,016) 
(Log) Population ,211              
(,147) 
-,119             
(,179) 
(Log) GDP per 
capita 
,905***              
(,189) 
1,413***            
(,228) 
Muslim Population -,027***             
(,007) 
-,035***             
(,007) 
Oil production -2,262***           
(,000) 
-2,878           
(,000) 
   
Constant -1,547         
(2,329) 
-2,869         
(2,727) 
R2 ,498 ,710 
Number of 
observations 
62 37 
Beta values displayed in the table. Standard errors presented in parentheses. 
 *** significant at 99 %, ** significant at 95 %, * significant at 90 %. 
 
The results go contrary to previous research that suggest that decentralisation 
improves democratic quality (Martinez-Vazquez & McNab 2006). This has most 
likely to do with the fact that the present study is concerned with a different 
sample of countries, which indicates that decentralisation is more difficult in this 
population. The effect of decentralisation is very small and not statistically 
significant. Fiscal decentralisation is even negatively correlated to democracy in 
control for other variables. Interesting to note is that this negative correlation 
becomes significant at the 95 % security level when the logarithm of fiscal 
decentralisation is taken, as in table 4 in the appendix (section 8.2.1). This suggest 
that fiscal decentralisation at a general level might even damage democratic 
quality in the population.  
In sum, the argument that decentralisation improves democratic quality cannot 
be confirmed in my analysis, regardless of operationalization. Fiscal 
decentralisation could even have a negative impact on democracy. This is a very 
interesting finding considering how decentralisation in developing countries is 
often marketed as a means of democratisation. Caution should, however, be 
exercised due to the small sample and the large number of missing cases. 
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5.4 Reflexions on the Findings 
The findings from this study show that the effect of decentralisation on democracy 
is negligible and the statistical analysis shows no significant correlation between 
the variables. Even though the results go contrary some previous findings (i.e. 
Martinez-Vazquez & McNab 2006), they also confirm a general notion that the 
benefits from decentralisation “are far from certain and automatic” (Smoke et al. 
2006a: 4). Decentralisation is associated with risks (Prud’homme 1995) and the 
findings from much of the previous empirical research suggest that the results are 
“mixed at best” (Kauneckis & Andersson 2009: 24). 
Neither political nor fiscal decentralisation correlate with democratic quality. 
The effect of political decentralisation is an average of just 0.003 points on the 0-
10 democracy scale, in control for other variables. Fiscal decentralisation even 
turns out negative in the model. Decentralisation does not, at a general level, seem 
to be an effective tool to improve democratic quality, which is one of the most 
commonly used arguments to promote the reforms. As a matter of fact, I even find 
some indications of a significant negative correlation between the variables (see 
appendix). This could be further explored in a larger statistical study. 
Why does not decentralisation seem to promote democratisation? In the 
survey of decentralisation in the world in chapter 3, I gave an account of the 
difficulties connected with decentralisation in these countries, which might give 
some clues about the absence of a causal correlation. As I have shown, one of the 
main issues concerning decentralisation in many countries is the inefficient public 
institutions and scarcity of resources to fund the local institutions (Bratic 2008: 
149; Olowu & Wunsch 2004: 13-14). A second issue refers to corruption and 
clientelism. Local elite capture, such as the neopatrimonial structures in many 
Africa countries, is a recurrent phenomenon (Olowu & Wunsch 2004: 13-24; 
Harbers 2010: 607). In some cases it has even given rise to subnational 
authoritarianism in otherwise democratic countries (Gibson 2005). A third issue is 
finding the right balance between central and non-central government entities. 
This has to do with the difficulties of maintaining hard budget constraints and 
keeping the local governments from behaving irresponsibly with its resources, 
which has proven to be difficult in some countries (Oates 2005: 361; Eaton & 
Dickovick 2006). Interjurisdictional competition does, thus, not always lead to 
improved practises. When local governments are dependent on fiscal transfers, as 
opposed to their own tax revenues, there is also a risk for the establishment of 
systems of patronage in which the central government retain its control over local 
government activities (Hadenius & Uggla: 1631). Another difficulty in regards to 
decentralisation is to maintain national unity. In Latin America, decentralisation 
seems to have contributed to state fragmentation, the collapses of previously 
dominant parties and the obstruction of the development of nationalised party 
systems (Bland 2011: 67; Harbers 2010: 607; Sabatini 2003). A combination of 
these factors is likely to have limited the positive impact of decentralisation on the 
studied countries. 
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However, I do not think the results should be interpreted as an argument 
against decentralisation. Few would argue that the breakaway from the tradition of 
centralised government in the surveyed countries – often connected to colonial 
heritage or authoritarianism – is entirely without its merits. Rather, it underlines 
the complexity of the processes and the importance of good implementation. 
Decentralisation comes in a number of forms, and the importance of the different 
types of decentralisation should be emphasised (Oates 2005: 355; Rondinelli 
1980: 137). 
The analysis does, on the other hand, show empirical support for a connection 
between decentralisation and political participation, which deserves further 
elaboration. Given the long theoretical tradition of emphasising small democratic 
units as a favourable setting for citizen engagement in politics, the results are very 
encouraging. According to my findings, the effect of political decentralisation is, 
ceteris paribus, about 9 % higher voter turnout. Furthermore, non-electoral 
participation is connected with fiscal decentralisation at a significant level, 
although these results are less certain. This suggests that citizens in the observed 
countries take advantage of the improved possibilities of influencing public. The 
limited data and the weak significant correlation between fiscal decentralisation 
and non-electoral participation make it impossible to claim that there is an 
established connection. The p-value for fiscal decentralisation is ,065 in the 
model, which means that there is a 6.5 % risk that the correlation is due to chance, 
that is, a type I error (rejecting a true null hypothesis) (Studenmund 2005: 116, 
125). Moreover, as I have previously discussed, the presence of sampling errors 
caused by self-selection in the sample cannot be ruled out. A further point that 
should be kept in mind when considering the results is that the findings are not 
completely coherent. The analysis shows no correlation between fiscal 
decentralisation and voter turnout, or political decentralisation and non-electoral 
participation. Notwithstanding theses uncertainties, the results do show empirical 
support for a connection between the decentralisation and political participation, 
which is interesting considering the central position this correlation has in both 
normative and practical theories of decentralisation. 
In regards to the correlation between decentralisation and voter turnout a 
natural follow-up question is what causes the correlation, and if the same 
correlation can be found between decentralisation and turnout in local elections. 
The causal mechanism cannot be further investigated based on these data. But on 
the basis of previous research and theoretical literature, there is room for 
speculations. 
Decentralisation can in theory improve representation and give more people a 
stake in politics. If wider societal groups are represented, more people are likely 
to want to maintain the political system (Rondinelli 1980). Increased integration 
and local participation could also foster the development of civic virtues and a 
wider interest for society among the citizens (see van der Meer & van Ingen 
2009). The local level could function as a school of democracy. Credible local 
leaders could also compete on a national level, where they can be evaluated on 
their past records in the local governments (Fox 1994). This could in turn explain 
why more people vote in elections in decentralised countries. But the effect of 
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decentralisation is not unison across countries, and neither should it be expected 
to be so within individual countries. If decentralisation promotes voter turnout by 
making political representation more inclusive, the effects should be most visible 
in small and remote jurisdictions, and less so in highly populated capital regions. 
How decentralisation affects different types of jurisdictions could consequently be 
tested within a single country. This has been done in the previously referred 
studies on decentralisation in Germany and Spain (Michelsen et al. 2014; Blais et 
al. 2011) and could be repeated in a carefully selected developing country, with 
different contextual conditions. This approach gives the researcher the possibility 
to investigate whether the effect of decentralisation differ according to factors 
such as size, remoteness, wealth and ethnic structures. This could be done in 
another study to further explore the causal mechanism of this correlation.  
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6 Conclusion 
The purpose of this thesis has been to investigate how decentralisation has 
affected democratic quality and political participation in non-Western countries. 
To answer the research question I have tested three hypotheses in multiple 
regression analyses. In this section I sum-up the main findings from the thesis. 
A combination of political and economic reasons motivated countries to 
reshape the vertical power distribution between different tiers of government. 
Decentralisation is said to improve the efficiency of the public sector and making 
government more accessible to the citizens. Although the demand for 
decentralisation in the developing world was in large part home-grown, 
international actors such as donor organisations, lending institutions and 
organisations for economic cooperation also encouraged the process. 
Decentralisation was promoted as a strategy to enhance democratic quality, 
improve political representation and to stimulate citizen participation in the 
political processes. But structural conditions often make decentralisation more 
difficult in developing or newly democratised countries. Weak political 
institutions in combination with corruption and clientelism increase the risk for 
local elite capture and decentralised corruption. The benefits from decentralisation 
are in other words not certain, and the reforms are in many cases connected with 
risks. 
Since the 1980s, most countries in the world have decentralised government 
functions. In the non-Western part of the world this development was in many 
cases part of a wider process of democratisation and market liberalisations. 
Authoritarianism and economic failures in many countries caused the old 
centralised system to lose its political legitimacy. Apart from some general trends, 
decentralisation has also different regional characteristics. In the former Eastern 
bloc, decentralisation was a breakaway from central planning and in some places 
an adjustment to European standards. In Latin America high degrees of 
centralisation was a colonial heritage, which radically changed when the region 
re-democratised in the third wave of democratisation. In Asia, decentralisation 
became necessary due to structural changes and an increased demand for public 
services. The Asian financial crisis and democratic transitions were other 
important factors. Africa has experienced failed attempts of decentralisation in the 
past. But in the 1990s, new and more ambitious decentralising reforms were 
implemented. The reforms have proven difficult in the African continent due to a 
scarcity of resources, neopatrimonialism and the fragile African states. 
The results from my study show that decentralisation positively correlates 
with both electoral and non-electoral political participation, in control for other 
relevant variables. Political decentralisation is strongly correlated with voter 
turnout in national elections. The effect of political decentralisation in the sample 
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is over 9 % higher voter turnout, at an average. The causal mechanism of this 
correlation cannot be further explored based on my data. The most likely 
interpretation, based on previous literature, is that decentralisation has been 
successful in improving representation and has created more inclusive societies in 
which more people are liable to vote. Fiscal decentralisation does not seem to 
have the same effect on voter turnout in national elections. My second finding is 
that fiscal decentralisation positively correlates with non-electoral participation. 
The correlation is not very strong and is based on a small number of observations, 
but is nevertheless theoretically interesting. Scholars have since the time of de 
Tocqueville argued that decentralisation can induce citizen to take part in politics. 
As mentioned, promoting citizen participation has been one of the core arguments 
when international organisations have pushed for decentralising reforms in the 
developing world. The findings from the present thesis give some empirical 
support for the assertion that bringing government closer to the citizens induces 
participation. Unfortunately, due to data uncertainties and somewhat mixed results 
in the analyses the findings should be evaluated with some caution. 
Finally, I find no correlation between decentralisation and democracy, 
regardless of which operalization of decentralisation that I use. When a 
logarithmic measurement of fiscal decentralisation is used, the variable even turns 
out strongly negatively correlated with democracy. The results go contrary to 
some previous research, but underline the distinctive difficulties encountered in 
many non-Western states and the importance of good implementation. Based on 
previous research on decentralisation in the four regions reviewed, it is possible to 
hypothesise about the reasons for the limited effects of the reforms. It seems like 
some of the main obstacles for decentralisation to function as a method of 
democratisation in the sample of countries selected are institutional weakness, 
corruption and clientelism, and, in some places, a scarcity of resources to fund 
local governments activities. The importance of local tax revenues could be 
examined in further studies. According to the theoretical literature, an 
overdependence on central fiscal transfers risks causing rent-seeking behaviour 
instead of promoting good practises, and facilitates the establishment of systems 
of patronage.  
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8 Appendix 
 
8.1 Variables 
8.1.1 Control variables 
Most of the control variables, but not all, are retrieved from the Quality of 
Government dataset (Teorell et al. 2013). What follows is a list of all control 
variables and the data sources. 
 
Compulsory voting: 
The data for compulsory voting are collected by the International Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA 2014b). This is a dummy-variable 
where 0 = no compulsory voting, 1 = compulsory voting. 
 
Years in education: 
The variable for years in education is retrieved from the Quality of Government 
(QoG) database. The data are originally collected by the Institute for Health 
Metrics and Evaluation, at the University of Washington (Gakidou et al. 2010). I 
have calculated the average score of number of years in education of women 
(ihme_ayef) and men (ihme_ayem) over 25 years of age. 
 
GDP per capita: 
The data on GDP per capita are retrived from QoG. The data are provided by the 
World Bank and are PPP-adjusted and expressed in constant international USD. 
The variable name in the QoG database is wdi_gdpc. 
 
Ethnic fractionalisation: 
The data are retrieved from the QoG database, and originally collected by Alesina 
et al (2003). The data refer to the probability that two randomly selected persons 
in a country belong to the same ethno linguistic group. Ethnicity is defined both in 
terms of race and linguistic characteristics. A high score on this variable indicates 
a high degree of fractionalisation. The variable name in the QoG database is 
al_ethnic. 
 
Corruption perceptions: 
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The data on perceptions of corruption are collected by Transparency International, 
and are retrieved through the QoG database. The variable name is ti_cpi. The 
index ranges from 0-10, where a high level indicates low levels of perceived 
corruption by business people, risk analysts and the general public. 
 
Proportional representation: 
The data are retrieved from the QoG database and are originally published in the 
World Bank database of Political Institutions (Beck et al. 2001). The variable is 
called dpi_pr and the applied year is 2012. The variable is a dummy for whether 
any candidate in any house is elected by proportional representational electoral 
rules. 0 = no proportional representation, 1 = proportional representation. 
 
Population: 
Population is measured in thousands of citizens. This variable is retrieved from 
the QoG database where it is called gle_pop. The data are originally collected by 
Gleditsch (2002). 
 
Muslim population: 
Data for Muslim population are retrieved from the QoG database and is measured 
as Muslims as percentage of the total population in 1980. The variable name is 
lp_muslim80 and is originally collected by La Porta et al. (1999). 
 
Oil production: 
The amount of oil production is measured in metric tons. The data for this is 
retrieved from the QoG database where it is called ross_oil_prod. The data are 
originally collected by Ross (2013). 
8.1.2 Dependent and Independent Variables 
 
 
Fiscal decentralisation: 
Fiscal decentralisation is calculated as all subnational revenue and expenses 
expressed in per cent of general government’s revenue and expenses. Subnational 
revenue and expense shared are calculated separately, after which I calculate the 
average score in per cent. Data are taken from the IMF Government Finance 
Statistics Yearbook (GFSY). I have used the 2012, 2010, 2008 and 2006 printed 
editions. Also, data for the last three years are available online at IMF’s GFS 
database (International Monetary Fund 2014). These data are, however, not as 
complete as in the printed editions. 
 
Political decentralisation: 
Political decentralisation is operationalized as a dummy variable where 1 = 
politically decentralised, and 0 = not politically decentralised. To be counted as 
politically decentralised, the legislative and executive policy makers must be 
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locally elected. Data are collected from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators (2014). The variable name is muni. Where data are missing, I have 
updated the data according to the same definitions. For this purpose, I have used 
data from the Inter American Dialogue, found on the Political Database of 
Americas’ webpage (2014), which is provided by the Center for Latin American 
Studies at Georgetown University. In addition, I have used data from the electoral 
commissions in some of the individual countries. All data are carefully assessed 
and crosschecked. 
 
Democracy: 
To measure degree of democracy I have used an index created by Hadenius and 
Teorell (2004). The index combines the scores from Polity IV and Freedom 
House’s democracy indices, rescaled on a scale from 0 to 10. The scores are then 
combined and the average score is calculated. This variable is called fh_ipolity2 
in the QoG database.   
 
Non-electoral participation: 
As an indicator of non-electoral participation I use survey data from World Value 
Survey. I have created an index by adding together seven indicators of political 
participation. The data are collected from three different survey waves: wave four, 
five and six (see reference list for details). The following variables are included in 
the index. 
 
V28: Membership in a labour union 
The survey participant is asked whether he or she is a member to a labour 
union. This question has three alternative answers: active member, 
inactive member, and don’t belong. For each country, I have added the 
active members and inactive members together and calculated the total per 
cent of people that chose these alternatives. 
 
V29: Membership in a political party 
 This question is formulated as V28, and calculated in the same manner. 
 
V30: Membership in an environmental organisation 
 This question is formulated and calculated as above-mentioned. 
 
V32: Membership in a humanitarian or charitable organization 
 Formulated and calculated as above. 
 
V85: Signing a petition 
The participant is asked whether he or she have signed a petition. The 
alternative answers are have done, might do, and would never do. I have 
used the have done-answer in each country as per cent of total answers. 
 
V86: Joining in boycotts 
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As in V85, the participant is asked about whether he or she has, might do, 
or would never take part in a boycott. I have used the answers for have 
done as per cent of all answers. 
 
V87: Attending peaceful demonstrations 
This question is formulated in the same way as V85 and V86. I have used 
the have done alternative as per cent of all answers. 
 
Voter turnout: 
The data for voter turnout in national elections are collected by the International 
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA 2014c). I have used the 
so-called VAP Turnout, which is voter turnout measured in percentages of the 
voting aged population that voted in a national election. Where data is available 
for both parliamentary and presidential elections, I have used the election with the 
highest voter turnout. 
8.2 Alternative Models 
8.2.1 Fiscal Decentralisation and Democracy 
 
Table 4  
Freedom House/ 
Polity IV 
(Log) Fiscal 
decentralisation 
-,441**             
(,000) 
(Log) Population -4,245             
(2,525) 
(Log) GDP per 
capita 
1,592***            
(,229) 
Muslim Population -,035***             
(,007) 
Oil production -3,101           
(,000) 
  
Constant -4,245         
(2,525) 
R2 ,741 
Number of 
observations 
37 
Beta values displayed in the table. Standard errors presented in parentheses. 
 *** significant at 99 %, ** significant at 95 %, * significant at 90 %. 
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8.2.2 Fiscal Decentralisation and Political Participation 
 
Table 5  
Voter 
turnout 
 
Non-electoral 
participation 
(Log) Fiscal 
decentralisation 
-1,042 
(28,315) 
,1,604      
(10,663) 
Compulsory 
voting 
14,722*** 
(4,938) 
– 
Years in 
education 
,672 
(1,089) 
-,850      
(3,458) 
(Log) GDP per 
capita 
7,821 
(4,629) 
-2,993        
(18,331) 
Ethnic 
fractionalisation 
– 58,336 
(48,057) 
Corruption 
perceptions 
-3,998 
(2,571) 
6,867      
(8,174) 
Proportional 
representation 
-,564 
(6,046) 
– 
   
Constant 1,585 
(28,315) 
51,600 
(150,831) 
R2 ,355 ,177 
Number of 
observations 
37 24 
Beta values displayed in the table. Standard errors presented in parentheses. 
 *** significant at 99 %, ** significant at 95 %, * significant at 90 %. 
 
  
